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we are working in research and publication field.
About PRS
People's Research Society (PRS) is a group of 10-12 persons with varied experiences including research, academics, publication, grassroot activism, teaching- training and NGOs and people’ movements. Our coming together is prompted by the need for a research group in M.P. The absence of such bodies is seriously felt in this Hindi -speaking zone. Several duties of social criticism and social activism are being performed by the various NGOs and people’s organisations in MadhyaPradesh and around. They are addressing a large number of issues such as forest-land-water, education, gender, health etc. Often these activities do not leave with them enough time and priority to explore these issues in depth. PRS works on this space believing that it could lead to more informed debates and informed activists. The thrust areas of our involvement are research, documentation and translation (mainly from the other languages to Hindi) and discussion and training on the issues.
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New Social movment
Analysing New Social Movements: A case study of Adivasi Mukti Sangathan


The purpose of this paper is to analyse the political content of New Social Movements. I believe that the distinguishing trait of new social movements is that they have are anchored in a locality, have a well-defined social base and that this social base is non-class, instead it can be described as a movement having an ethnic base. It will be pertinent to point out here that even though the thrust of the paper is theoretical, yet it will be presented not as an exercise in abstract theorising. Rather I will attempt to present it in the form a concrete analysis of concrete situation.

I do not dismiss the attempts to develop generalised theoretical attempts to analyse and interpret New Social Movements. Such attempts do have a value. However, I refrain from doing so since from my experience I have realised that the New Social Movements do not have a homogenous model of praxis. There are a variety of tendencies present in it. Hence for the purposes of a political dialogue a generalised theoretical attempt may not be very fruitful. Hence I have chosen to analyse Adivasi Mukti Sangathan, an organisation and movement of the Barela adivasis of West Nimar, since this movement has all the distinctive traits of the New Social Movements.

The paper will have two sections the first section will endeavour to show the material basis for the emergence of New Social Movements such as AMS. Here I will attempt to show the structural and historical dynamics that led to the emergence of regional, social and ethnic identities in Madhya Pradesh. In the second section I will attempt to do content analysis of AMS and its politics. This evaluation, however, is aimed not so much at compiling the list of successes and failures of the organisation but to understand the nature and character of the demands raised by it and the adequacy of the tactics adopted by AMS in ameliorating the adivasi situation. The second section, therefore, involves two kinds of comparison, first that between the programme and style of functioning of AMS with the larger political organisations. This will help us primarily in understanding the specific nature and character of the AMS vis-à-vis the mainstream political parties. Second, we will compare AMS’ programme and tactics with the specific form of exploitation and the impact of this exploitation on the internal structure of the Bhils and their sub-groups and the relationship between them. This will primarily help us in understanding the adequacy of the programme and tactics adopted by the AMS in ameliorating the adivasi situation.



Part I

Structural causes for emergence of regional, social and ethnic identities in Madhya Pradesh

It is the ground of death and life, the path of survival
and destruction, so it is imperative to examine it.
------ The Art of War
Sun Tzu

‘Madhya Pradesh’ lies on the table land of Central India between 18 degrees North to 26½ degrees North and between longitudes 74 degrees East to 84 degrees East, with the Tropic of Cancer running along parallel to its principal river Narmada. With an area of 4,43,446 square kilometre (now the territory of Chattisgarh measuring 1,35,237 sq. km has been carved out) it is the largest state of India.

Its location, as can be deduced from above, situates it almost in the centre of India. Since the region is in the very heartland of India, it has always been part of important historical developments . It was the site of human settlements in the Paleolithic and Neolithic period. Ancient texts such as Vedic, Puranic, Buddhist and Jain literature and the travelogues of Hiuen Tsang make references of this area. In the Ancient time the eastern and northern parts of Madhya Pradesh were known as Mahakaushal. The western part was known as Malwa. Dandakaryanya extended from Yamuna to Godavari .

In periods of centralization these areas were welded into larger empires, however in periods of decentralization they invariably passed into autonomous rule. During the Maurya period almost the entire area comprising present Madhya Pradesh came under the Mauryan Empire. Thence the Soongs, who succeeded the Mauryas, ruled over the area except for the regions of Malwa and Tripuri, which were conquered by the Satvahanas. Soongs and Satvahanas were followed by short rule of Kushans, Shakas and Vakataks. In the later part of 4th century A.D. a large part of Madhya Pradesh acknowledged the suzerainty of Guptas.

In 5th century A.D. the Gupta empire broke up and Malwa and some other areas briefly passed into the hands of the Huns. After the defeat of the Huns at the hands of Yashodharman in 528 A.D. a number of dynasties ruled over different parts of Madhya Pradesh, Pratihar, Kachhapghat, Kalchuri and Parmar in Malwa; Nagvanshi, Kalchuri, Rashtrakuta and Gonds in Bundelkhand. In 1294 Allauddin Khalji conquered Malwa and thenceforth the area was by and large under the rule of different Muslim rulers for about five centuries. In Chattisgarh of Mahakaushal, Sirpur dynasty came to power in the 6th century A.D. Pandu dynasty succeeded them. Then the Kalturies of Ratanpur ruled this area for almost 800 years till the Bhonslas defeated them.

The area once again underwent process of centralization under the Mughals when Akbar established control over almost the entire area. This situation continued till the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, when once again fissiparous tendencies were set into motion. With the weakening of Mughal central authority the Bundelas built a kingdom between Yamuna and Narmada that reached it zenith under Chhatrasal. However, in 1729 in return of political help Chhatrasal ceded northern Malwa and Saugar to the Peshwa. By the end of 18th century Marathas held sway over the entire area now covered under Madhya Pradesh. However, this hold was not centralized. Instead, the area was divided between three Maratha chiefs. Bhonsles controlled the area that included almost the entire region that formed central provinces and Berar except Saugar-Damoh area. Scindhias controlled Gwalior and the Holkars Indore.

The process of centralization once again began under the British. After the successful culmination of Anglo-Maratha war 1816-1818 established British power in the area and by 1854 British domination was established over almost entire Madhya Pradesh. Their direct rule was limited to the districts of Saugar-Damoh, Mandla, Betul, Seoni and Narmada valley by 1818. In 1820 the territories of Garakota, Malthaun Deori and Rahatgarh were taken from the Scindhias. The territories taken from Peshwa, Scindhias and Bhonsles were constituted as Saugar-Narmada territory. It was joined to North Western Provinces in 1830. In 1854 Bhonsla kingdom was annexed and formed into Nagpur Province under a Chief Commissioner.

After the 1857 wars the region underwent an administrative reorganisation. Saugar-Narmada area was joined to Nagpur Province in 1861 thus forming The Central Provinces in 1861. The native kingdoms of central Bundelkhand, Scindhia and Holkar together formed the Central India Agency. In 1864, the district of Nimar was joined to the Central Province and 1903 Berar was also joined thus forming the enlarged Province of Central Provinces and Berar. Fifteen fiduciary states were placed under the administration of Central Province (one from Hoshangabad district and 14 from Chattisgarh division). The region was renamed as Madhya Pradesh in the Constitution of India.

The state of Madhya Pradesh acquired its present shape in 1956 as a result of States Reorganisation. Madhya Bharat, Vidhya Pradesh and Bhopal, fourteen Hindi-speaking districts (Mahakoshal) of old Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh region and Sironj sub-division of Kotah district of Rajasthan excluding the Sunel enclave of Mandsaur district of Madhya Bharat, together constituted Madhya Pradesh. The state is completely land-locked and is surrounded by seven states; Rajasthan on the northwest, Uttarpradesh on the north, Bihar on the north east, Orissa on the east, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra on the south and by Gujarat on the west.

Thus by reorganizing the administrative areas the biggest state of India was founded. The magnitude of its size can be brought home if we know that the state is bigger than some fairly large countries such as unified Germany, Italy, Japan, and U.K. etc. Its population at 66181170 (as per the 1991 census), once again is larger than several countries. This vast tract of land was brought under one administration, yet several natural, regional, linguistic, economic and political differences continued to exist. These differences are so stark and significant that scholars have called it “a geographical entity with ‘split personalities’ politically and administratively”.


The state is a watershed of several rivers flowing in different directions. Chambal and Son flow in the northward direction to feed Ganga and Yamuna, Narmada and Tapti flow westward towards the Arabian Sea and Mahanadi flows eastward towards the Bay of Bengal. In such a watershed area, the ranges of low mountains intersected by river valleys break up the state into six different natural regions: 1) Chambal Basin; 2) Malwa and Vindhya Plateau, 3) Narmada Son Trench; 4) Satpura, Mahadev and Maikal Ranges; 5) Chhattisgarh Plain; and 6) Bastar Plateau. Climatically the state has a tropical climate with hot dry summer in April-June; from July to September monsoon rains break and this is followed by a cool and dry winter. But here too there are regional variations. The average rainfall of the state is approx. 45’, but it decreases from east to west. The Southeastern districts receive the heaviest rainfall with some places receiving as much as 70’. The Western and Northwestern districts receive only 30’ and less.

Soil types also differ from area to area thus having a direct bearing not only on the fertility of the land but also on the type of crops cultivated. Deep black soil (alluvial deposit) is found in the valleys of Narmada and Son and in a narrow strip in the north. Black cotton soil is found in most of western Madhya Pradesh or Malwa Plateau. Black sandy soil is found in highlands of Bastar, Sarguja and Rajpur. Red and yellow soil is found around Katni. Black loamy soil, which is not good for cultivation but can sustain forest, is found in Satpura ranges and plateau.

The political differences were even more significant. As already mentioned Madhya Pradesh was formed by detaching the Hindi speaking regions from the Central Province and attaching them with Madhya Bharat, Vindhya Pradesh and Bhopal. These regions, prior to their integration followed very different patterns and rates of political, economic and social development. The political units were constituted of regional formations with their own specific formations. Mahakoshal appears as the biggest and the most developed. It was a part of Central Province and Berar and being under direct British rule witnessed intensive nationalist activities. Two important towns Jabalpur and Saugar are situated here. However, Chattisgarh and Bastar are by far the most backward areas.

Vindhya Pradesh consisting of 35 states of Bundelkhand and Baghelkhand were first constituted as a self-governing union of states on April 18, 1948, but due to corruption, political turmoil and misadministration it was taken over by the Central Government and administered as a Chief Commissioner’s State. Then it became a part of Madhya Pradesh during the States Reorganisation. It is only marginally more developed than Chattisgarh and Bastar.

Madhya Bharat, a Part B state before State Reorganisation, was next only to Mahakoshal in economic development. However, the form and direction of political development was very different from the latter. Unlike Mahakoshal, which was a centre of intense nationalist activity, Madhya Bharat like other parts of Princely India did not play any role in the nationalist activity. Here the activities of ‘Prajamandals’ for democratic reforms occupied the central stage. The political life of this region was also determined by the rivalry of Princely states especially that between Indore and Gwalior.

Bhopal, which was ruled by a dynasty of Nawabs during the British rule, was taken over by the government of India on June 1, 1949 as a Chief Commissioner’s State. After the Reorganisation, Bhopal city was made the capital of Madhya Pradesh.

Thus the area united under one administrative head was actually consisting of cultural and political regions that had undergone very different economic and political developments. This created an immediate complication in political and administrative management of the state. Regional pulls continued to play a vital role even after the reorganisation of the state. Even procedural administrative activities of providing uniform land settlement system had to overcome the basic difference in laws and property relations in the different regions.

One of the first acts of the Government of India pertaining to rural India was abolition of landlordism. On April 5th, 1950 M.P. assembly passed the M.P. Alienation of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act 1950. Similar laws were passed in Madhya Bharat, Vindhya Pradesh and Bhopal by the time of the Reorganisation of 1956. But these laws were very different from each other and at the time of inception of the new Madhya Pradesh there were fourteen different land settlement systems prevalent in different parts of Madhya Pradesh. To overcome this situation a new M.P. Land Revenue Code was promulgated and applied on October 2, 1959.

Political and economic development in Madhya Pradesh was complicated not only because of the different forms and rate of development of economy and politics in the regions. It was also the case that there was not always a fit between geo-cultural location of a place and the political unit to which it belonged.

Our area of study is located in the Malwa region. This geo-cultural zone predates the formation of Madhya Pradesh. The zone finds references even in the Ancient texts. Scholars suggest that “on the basis of physiography, historical-cultural relations, political background as well as geographical regional characteristics, Malwa Region forms a distinct unit…” Other than the areas in Madhya Pradesh the zone includes Basnwara and Jhalawar districts and Pratapgarh and Achnera tehsils of Chittorgarh district of Rajasthan and eight tehsils of Dhulia and Jalgaon districts of Maharashtra. In Madhya Pradesh the zone comprises of “(1) Ujjain, (2) Dhar, (3) Indore, (4) Jhabua, (5) certain parts of East and West Nimar districts (though not the farther talukas adjoining Rajasthan), (6) Shivpuri, (7) Guna, (8) Ratlam, (9) some portions of Gwalior (excluding the tehsils adjoining Rajasthan), (10) Shajapur, (11) Rajgarh, and (12) some portions of the districts to the east of the above 11 districts of Madhya Pradesh where the people identify themselves, more or less, to belonging to Malwa.”

As is evident that the region was superimposed with an administrative demarcation that divided it into three different states viz., Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Rajasthan. Furthermore, even in Madhya Pradesh areas belonging to it were placed in different political and administrative units. For instance though some areas under Gwalior were parts of Malwa, Gwalior was almost entirely in the political unit of Madhya Bharat. While even when East and West Nimar were parts of Malwa they were placed in the political unit of Central Province. This divergence in the boundaries of geo-cultural zones and political units further complicated development of political and economic processes not only in Madhya Pradesh but also in the political units that were combined to form Madhya Pradesh.

Madhya Pradesh, therefore, appears as a very complex political and economic entity with very specific geo-cultural and regional tendencies. These geo-cultural regions have their own specific rhythms and dynamics of development. Not only are the form and rate of development of these regions different but also at times they develop in opposite or contending directions. Politics and economy therefore are very complicated processes in Madhya Pradesh that may not be encapsulated in any simple formulaic generalization.

This already complex situation is further complicated by the yawning gap between the potential and the reality of the state. The state abounds in natural, forest and mineral resources. It has a variety of soil types making it possible to cultivate a wide variety of crops. Approximately 27% of India’s total forest cover is in Madhya Pradesh that produce some very important forest products such as Teak, Sal, Saj, Lendia, Dhaora, Bija, Tendu, Mahua, Bamboo, Palas, Babul, Salai, Bhiesa, Anjan and Harra. The state is exceptionally well endowed with mineral resources. It has very large reserves of coal, bauxite and manganese. Almost 27 different types of minerals are being mined in the state the more prominent among them being coal, limestone, iron-ore, manganese, dolomite, bauxite, fire-clay and china-clay, corundum, steatite, ochre, rock phosphate, copper-ore, diamond, gold, tin, phosphorite, felspar, fluorspar, asbestos, mica, barites, galena, nickel, sillimanite and lepidolite. The state is a watershed of several rivers Chambal, Son, Narmada, Tapti and Mahanadi thus creating one of the largest hydro-potential in the country.

With such a large resource base one would assume a dynamic and developed state but on the contrary Madhya Pradesh is a very backward State. Despite being rich in resources it is one of the poorest states in India. Since the 1970’s it continues to be the third poorest state of India (only Orissa and Bihar are poorer). A vast majority of the population stays below the poverty line.
Year No. Of Persons (In Lakhs) Percentage of Persons
1973-741977-781983-841987-881993-l9941999-2000 276.30302.87277.97264.30296.52298.54 61.7861.7849.7643.0742.5237.43
Source: Basic Rural Statistics, (Ministry of Rural Development, 2001)
Not only does an abnormally large proportion of population lives in poverty, this poverty is crushing. This can be gauged from the abysmally low per-capita monthly income set as poverty line.

Poverty Lines as per the new official methodology (Rs. Monthly per capita for urban areas)
1973-74 1977-78 1983-84 1987-88 1993-94 1999-2000
63.02 74.40 122.82 178.35 317.16 481.65
Source: Basic Rural Statistics, (Ministry of Rural Development, 2001)
The Per capita Per month income set as poverty line for the rural area is even lower. For the year 1999-2000, while the per capita per month income for urban areas was 481.65 for the rural areas it was 311.34. This abject poverty has taken its toll and in the year 2000 the state had an Infant Mortality Rate of 88 that was second only to Orissa.

Similar imbalance in potential and reality is seen in the area of hydro-potential. Madhya Pradesh is a watershed of several rivers yet this is not reflected in its pattern of irrigation. Wells rather than canals continue to be the most important source of irrigation.


Canal Tank Well Other Total
Govt. Pvt. Total Tank Tube well Other well Other sources Total irri. Area
1996-97 1804 2 1806 189 1058 2412 844 6309
1997-98 1781 2 1783 219 1079 2424 799 6304
Source: Basic Rural Statistics, (Ministry of Rural Development, 2001) area in million Hectares.

Backwardness has resulted in an abysmally low social development. Literacy rate in Madhya Pradesh is amongst the worst in the country and is only marginally above that of Bihar, Rajasthan, Arunachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. For the large part of the last decade of the 20th century more than half the population of the state continued to be illiterate.

1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
M.P. 44 48 49 48 52 56
Source: Basic Rural Statistics, (Ministry of Rural Development, 2001)
Majority of the people continue to live in semi pucca and kutcha houses. This is in stark contrast to the all India average were the percentage households living in pucca households increased considerably in the decade of the 80s. It will be pertinent here to compare the national and state averages.
Madhya Pradesh
Pucca Semi-Pucca Kutcha
1981 25.02% 66.30% 8.68%
1991 30.47% 64.87% 4.66%
India
Pucca Semi-Pucca Kutcha
1981 32.67% 33.29% 34.04%
1991 41.61% 30.95% 27.44%
Source: Statistical Abstract India 2001.

The gap between the potential and the reality of the state is a statement of states backwardness and its unequal situation vis-à-vis other Indian states. This backward and sluggish pace of development is evident in the data stated in the foregoing tables. However, if we break-up these statistical aggregate we are confronted with another complexity inherent in Madhya Pradesh. Geographically, socially and economically there is a coexistence of pockets of development, literacy and wealth and that of poverty, illiteracy and very low human/social development.

Several scholars have attempted to study this uneven spread of backwardness in Madhya Pradesh. M.A. Oommen has attempted to identify the deprived regions of India and for this purpose he has used UNDP’S Human Development Index (HDI). He has used districts as the unit of analysis and database of his investigation is the 1981 census. Human development index of a district is worked out on the basis of rural literacy, rural female literacy and life expectancy. The author assumes that poverty is “basically capability deprivation… basic education, health care and other efforts towards building capacity of local community, therefore, assumes great significance.” On the basis of these components the author has ranked the districts of India.

Though, the analysis has been done at an all India level, which confirms that, the human development index (HDI) of the districts of Madhya Pradesh in 1981 amongst the lowest (Of the 45 districts of Madhya Pradesh in 1981, 41 have an HDI below the national average.). We will for our purpose only deal with the districts of Madhya Pradesh, since just as it is significant to note that most of the districts of Madhya Pradesh are very backward. It is equally significant to understand that this backwardness is unevenly spread across districts. For e.g., Indore is placed as high as 39th out of 372 districts analysed , Panna is ranked as low as 360.


Name of District HDI Ranking in M.P. HDI Ranking in India
IndoreBhopalGwaliorUjjainJabalpurDurgNarsimhapurDewasChindwaraHoshangabadSagarRaipurRaisenBalaghatRatlamVidisha 12345678910111213141516 39103139141165174175177203208211223224225226233

Name of District HDI Ranking in M.P. HDI Ranking in India
East NimarDharMandsaurMorenaBilaspurBhindSehoreDamohShajapurRaigarhBetulSeoniWest NimarRajnandgaonBastarSatnaRewaSurgujaGunaDatiaMandlaRajgarhShahdolChhatarpurSidhiTikamgarhShivpuriJhabuaPanna 1718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445 235239247249253259260273276278279280281287296304308312313314321325332347349354355357360
Concluded

Along with the uneven spread of underdevelopment amongst the districts it is also spread unevenly between urban and rural locales, amongst different social groups and classes. While discussing the low development index of Madhya Pradesh we had talked of literacy rate, life expectancy, etc. Oommen, by breaking up the data on a district wise basis, shows the uneven spread of literacy etc. at the district level. However, it is possible to break it up along different units as well.

Earlier we had discussed the high infant mortality rate (IMR) in Madhya Pradesh. With an IMR of 88 per thousand babies in 2000, M.P. has an IMR second only to Orissa. The grimness of the situation can be gauge from the fact that in the same year the national average of IMR was 68. However if we break the data up along urban and rural locale we are confronted with another staggering fact.

Infant Mortality Rate by Residence in Madhya Pradesh
Total Rural Urban
2000 88 94 54
Source: Statistical Abstract India 2001

Even at the face of it the difference between the urban and rural locale is staggering with the rural locale witnessing 40 infant deaths per thousand more than the urban locale. But the true extent of this asymmetry will hit us if we do some other series of comparisons. Rural MP witness 50% more infant deaths than the national average, while Urban MP has nearly 4% less infant deaths than the national average. With an IMR of 94 rural MP has most infant deaths, second only to Orissa that has an IMR of 99. But Urban MP with an IMR of 54 is far better situated. The states of Himachal Pradesh with 57, Rajasthan with 58, Uttar Pradesh with 65 and Rajasthan with 66, have Urban IMR worse than that of MP.

But perhaps the most telling difference between the rural and urban situation in MP is that the gap between the rural and urban IMR in MP is greater than that between the National IMR and the IMR of MP. The difference between the National IMR and that of MP for the year 2000 stands at 20 deaths per thousand; whereas, the difference between the Urban and Rural IMR of MP for the same year is 40 deaths per thousand. This juxtaposition of comparative differences underscores the asymmetries that Madhya Pradesh contains within itself.

The break-up of poverty related statistics along spatial and social lines also reveals fantastic asymmetries. Above we have quoted the data of last three decades of the 20th century to demonstrate the existence of sustained poverty amongst the vast majority of people living in Madhya Pradesh. This poverty is however distributed un-evenly between urban and rural locales and between social groups. To demonstrate this we take the figures of poverty in the year 1993-94 and break it up along spatial and social lines.

Number and Percentage of Population below poverty line by residence 1993-94
Rural Urban Combined
No. of Persons (In Lakhs) Percentage of Persons No. of Persons (In Lakhs) Percentage of Persons No. of Persons (In Lakhs) Percentage of Persons
216.19 40.64 82.33 48.38 298.52 42.52
Source: Basic Rural Statistics, (Ministry of Rural Development, 2001)
Thus, even though urban centres are more developed than rural centres the percentage of people living below poverty line is higher there in comparison with the rural sector. This, however, is true also for the national average. What distinguishes the situation of MP is not that the percentage of people living below poverty line is higher in the urban centres; the difference lies in the fact that this percentage is abnormally high. With 48.38 percent of people living below poverty line in the urban centres, MP has the highest percentage of urban population below poverty line. In comparison at least 12 states and union territories had larger percentage of rural population living below poverty line than that of MP.

The magnitude of unequal distribution of wealth and resources in the urban centres can be elucidated by comparing the difference between the incidence of poverty between the rural and urban centres of MP with the national average. In MP the percentage of people living below poverty line in the Urban Centres are 48.38 and that in Rural Centres 40.64, in the year 1993-94. National averages of the same locales for the year 1993-94 are 32.36 and 32.27 respectively. This leads us to the inevitable conclusion that compared to the average urban centres in the country; urban centres in Madhya Pradesh are far more asymmetrical.

Given the fact that urban centres in Madhya Pradesh are more developed than the rural centres, in comparison to the national average; a further conclusion can be drawn. Since urban centres are more developed than the rural centres there is a greater concentration of resources in the urban centres. Furthermore, since the urban centres of MP is more unequally structured than the national average. It follows that there is a greater concentration of wealth, resources and power in the hands of fewer people in Madhya Pradesh. Conversely, it can be deduced that in the urban centres the incidence of poverty amongst marginal and underprivileged social groups will be much higher than the averages even in MP.

Fortunately, data is available to demonstrate this conclusion, lest it would have remained just an indirect deduction from a general database. We have already quoted above the number and percentage of population living below poverty line by residence in 1993-94. If we juxtapose it with statistical break-up of the incidence of poverty amongst the Scheduled Castes and Tribes in the urban and rural locales we will find that poverty is much more rampant in these marginal and underprivileged sections of the society. And that it is greater in the more developed urban centre. Meaning that they fall very much in the rain shadow of development processes.

Percentage of Population living under poverty line 1993
Rural Urban
Total Population 40.64% 42.52%
Scheduled Caste Population 45.83% 65.00%
Scheduled Tribe Population 56.69% 65.28%
Source: Basic Rural Statistics, (Ministry of Rural Development, 2001)

Uneven spread of poverty and backwardness means that some areas, locations and social groups are placed at a greater disadvantage. This is borne out by the statistics sited above. However, what is not immediately clear is that the sections that are falling in the rain shadow of development are increasingly becoming incapable of maintaining even their already abysmal conditions of living. Their lives are becoming increasingly unviable. They are becoming increasingly unable to reproduce their basic conditions of existence, such as housing.

Pucca Semi-Pucca Kutcha
Percentage of Household Propn. (%) in bad condition Percentage of Household Propn. (%) in bad condition Percentage of Household Propn. (%) in bad condition
Rural 13.35 1.85 78.30 8.06 8.35 34.57
Urban 58.65 2.31 36.70 17.41 4.65 57.93
Source: Statistical Abstract India 2001
That there is a direct correlation between the increasing unviable existence of the marginal sections and the existence of inequality is borne out by the fact that the proportion of semi pucca and kutcha houses in bad condition is much higher in the cities where the social structure is more unequal than in the villages. Furthermore, the more unequally situated the household the greater the extent of unviable existence. Thus the proportion of houses in bad conditions increases as we go down the ladder, with the least proportion of houses in bad condition in the pucca houses and the largest number of houses in bad condition in the kutcha houses.

Inequality is also spread across the gender divide and this inequality virtually takes us to the very centre of every household in Madhya Pradesh. An inkling of the extent of inequality can be gauged by the survey of the data on literacy rates. Data on the uneven spread of literacy in the state of Madhya Pradesh is available of the decade of the nineties. For the entire period one witnesses a constant lag in the percentage of female literacy in comparison to male literacy. What is more, this lag is witnessed in every social group and locales. This can be deduced from the tables given below, first for the entire state, then for the rural and urban centres and finally for the Scheduled Tribe population.

Literacy Rate in MP Year-wise and Sex-wise
Person Male Female
199119931994199519961997 444849485256 5861626165 70 293335343741
Source: Basic Rural Statistics, (Ministry of Rural Development, 2001)
Urban and Rural literacy in MP, Sex-wise for 1998
Rural Urban
Male Female Persons Male Female Persons
1998 62 34 49 83 66 75
Source: Basic Rural Statistics, (Ministry of Rural Development, 2001)
Scheduled Tribe literacy in MP, Sex-wise for 1991.
Persons Male Female
1991 16.8 25.2 8.4
Source: Primary Census Abstract: Scheduled Tribe Population (Census of India 1991).

The preceding pages demonstrate that the geo-political, cultural and economic space that we know as Madhya Pradesh is a result of a superimposition of several layers of demarcations overtime . One of the earliest demarcations is the geological demarcation. The state has six different natural regions: 1) Chambal Basin; 2) Malwa and Vindhya Plateau, 3) Narmada Son Trench; 4) Satpura, Mahadev and Maikal Ranges; 5) Chhattisgarh Plain; and 6) Bastar Plateau. On this was superimposed the demarcations of the geo-cultural zones: the eastern and northern parts of Madhya Pradesh were known as Mahakaushal; the western part was known as Malwa and Dandakaryanya extended from Yamuna to Godavari. There was a further superimposition by political and administrative demarcations that went through phases of centralization and decentralization. Processes of centralization acquired stability with the British conquest, which divided the state into the directly governed Central India Province and Berar and the kingdoms of Bundelkhand, Scindhia and Holkar were formed as Central India Agency. Thence, through various stages the Indian government finally reconstituted this region in 1956 by detaching the Hindi speaking regions from the Central Province and attaching them with Madhya Bharat, Vindhya Pradesh and Bhopal.

These various layers of demarcation have their own rules and rates of transformation. Even the direction of the transformation often differed. Furthermore the superimposition of successive layers did not show any fidelity to the pre-existing boundaries. This is obvious since the logic of constitution and demarcation of every successive layer was different, it follows that boundaries of successive demarcations followed different logics. Very often, therefore, there was a misfit between the natural, geo-cultural and political boundaries. In the preceding pages we have shown how the Malwa region was superimposed with an administrative demarcation that divided it into three different states viz., Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Rajasthan. Furthermore, even in Madhya Pradesh areas belonging to it were placed in different political and administrative units. For instance though Indore and some areas under Gwalior were parts of Malwa, they were almost entirely in the political unit of Madhya Bharat. While even when East and West Nimar were parts of Malwa they were placed in the political unit of Central Province.

Lastly, each of the sediments (except the geological) is inlayed with social and economic formation. Till date at least three continue to survive, the pre-feudal (tribal or adivasi formation), the feudal formation (that was introduced by the Rajputs, Muslim and then the Maratha conquest) and the moribund capitalist formation (since it was introduced under the tutelage of colonialism). These formations had different laws of constitution and distinct asymmetries. Further more, unequal relationship held between them.

These different layers of superimposition constitute the social geomorphology of Madhya Pradesh. The superimposition results in bringing together in one locale a wide-ranging series of economic practices (both formal and informal, capitalist and pre capitalist), cultural practices and traditions and also geographical terrain. These practices get congealed providing the residence of that point of confluence of the practices with a ‘sense of a place’. The process of congealing is nothing other than the intersection of the distinct rate, trend and direction of the different social relation; with sedimentation of layers of different genre—geo-cultural, politico-administrative, etc; and with the transformation of outer nature.

Consequently, Madhya Pradesh includes within it locales that have an irreducible personality, a concrete density that is anchored in history, thereby granting these locales with a very specific and concrete identity. They play a significant role in determining the way in which social, political and economic processes will develop in these locales. This explains the relatively autonomous ways in which politics, economy, and other processes develop in the different pockets of Madhya Pradesh-- the phenomenon that has been given the pejorative term of regionalism by political scientists.

Thus, we identify the principle of relative autonomy of a locale. Yet, the locales are not isolated entities but exist in an unequal relationship with other locales that constitute the whole. It is equally important therefore to identify the principle of unity of the locale with the whole. The boundaries of the local and its principle of unity are determined by the contours of the dominant practices of a given formation . For e.g. in Madhya Pradesh the boundary and the meaning of local and central differed in phases of centralization and decentralization in different phases of history. For instance, during the Martha period, since the economy and polity was feudal, in spite of military conquest the rule was organized on economic and regional autonomy. During the British conquest, the colonial interest of uniformity of market, prices and administration; along with the demands to base their administration on support of traditional ruling class (esp. in the aftermath of 1857) the area was reorganized along directly administered Central Province and the traditionally administered Central India agency. Post ’47 compulsion though essentially similar underwent a slight but significant realignment of class relations thus producing a change principle of unity for the locality and thus also the re-demarcation of the boundary of the local.

There are, therefore, simultaneously two principles at work: The principle of relative autonomy, which is based on the temporal-spatial structuring of particular locales; and the principle of unity, which follows the contours of the dominant practices of a given formation. The two together determine the specific ways in which social, economic and other processes develop. The principle of unity determines the asymmetrical relationship that different locales enter into while constituting a whole. The principle of relative autonomy determines how processes and policies emerging from the dominant practices will play them selves out in each locale. While dealing with the data of poverty we have demonstrated above that how extent of the spread of poverty has significant correlation with the degree of inequality in the location of the locale or the social group. Thus, rural centres are poorer than urban centres. Similarly, in the data on extent of literacy shows that the degree of effective unfolding of the policy is directly determined by the extent of inequality in the location of the particular locale or social group.

It can, thus, be safely summarized that since the principle of unity derived from the dominant practices determines the unequal inscription of part into the whole, this unequal location determines how the policies and process from the centre of unity will unfold themselves in the various locales. There are, however, processes that emerge from within a locale. The principle of relative autonomy of the locale determines these processes. In other words the temporal-spatial structuring of particular social entity/locale. The specific affectivity of this principle can be demonstrated by analysing the peculiarity of data on sex ratio in Madhya Pradesh. Economists would have us believe that the more developed a society, the more favourable the sex ratio is towards women. In the preceding tables we have shown that as locales urban centres are more developed than rural centres and amongst the social groups adivasi community is the most backward. Logically, then sex ratio should have been most favourable for women in the urban centre and least favourable amongst the adivasi community. However, in Madhya Pradesh the reverse is true as can be seen from the table on urban, rural and tribal sex ratio in Madhya Pradesh in 1991.
Sex ratio in Madhya Pradesh, 1991
Male Female Sex ratio
Urban 8102940 7235897 892
Rural 26164353 24677980 943
Scheduled Tribes 7758174 7640860 984
Source: Census of India (1991)

This reversal of sound economic reasoning would appear confounding if we attempt to read the data abstractly, i.e. without locating it in temporal-spatial structuring of particular social entities. In the preceding tables dealing with poverty related data we had demonstrated that urban centres were more asymmetrically structured than rural centres and that amongst the social groups scheduled tribes are the least asymmetrically structured. It is this internal structuring of locales and social groups that determine the apparently universal process of sex ratio. The same is borne out by the data on poverty. Even when urban centres have a greater accumulation of resources since they are more asymmetrically structured the percentage of people, social groups, etc. below the poverty line is higher here.

Thus, we conclude the identification of the temporal-spatial structuring of Madhya Pradesh. This is the overarching structure within which West Nimar is located, the ground where the adivasi community is fighting a grim battle for death and life, for the path of survival.

Part II

Analysing the AMS

This is the section where we take account of the specific forms of exploitation of the adivasi community in West Nimar, the impact of this process on the position of the adivasi community vis-à-vis the ‘capitalist sector’ and also on the structure of the inter adivasi and the intra adivasi relationship. Here we also briefly recount the forms of organized struggle of the adivasi community especially under the Adivasi Mukti Sangathan (AMS). Finally, we will try to compare the significance of this political intervention in comparison to the interventions by much larger political organisations such as the Congress Party, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and its affiliated organisations, etc. Thus there are three foci of elucidation and analysis in this section.

1. A brief sketch of the history of AMS and its programmes and political tactics and strategy.
2. Specific forms of exploitation of the Bhils and its sub-groups in West Nimar.
3. Comparison of AMS with the rival political organisations active in West Nimar.


A brief sketch of the history of AMS and its programmes and political tactics and strategy.

The organisation was founded in 1992 and became a force to reckon with by 1994. Its activity, during the period of our fieldwork, was concentrated in the Sendhwa area. More than five hundred villages are located in their area of activity. The extent of the popularity of the organisation can be gauged from its impressive membership roll, which even according to the conservative estimates of the government officials stood between 14000-15000 at the peak of the organisations popularity. Creation of such a massive support base in such a brief period speaks eloquently not only of the dedication of the leadership and activists of the AMS but also of the fact that the issues raised by it must be having some local resonance.

The organisation has opted for decentralised form of organising since it is committed to the idea of promoting local initiative. The structure of the organisation was decided at the first major meeting in Khutwadi in January 1992. Initially there were three villages attached to the movement, viz. Khutwadi, Jhiree Jhamli and Dhanora. Each region was represented by seven members in the central committee. The structure of the central committee was replicated at the regional level and at a meeting on the 30th January 1992, it was decided that every member of the regional committee would link five villages to the movement. Again the structure of the central committee was to be replicated in these new areas with some minor changes.

The central committee, therefore, is the highest organ of the organisation. The committee is constituted of four office bearers—Adhyaksha, Up-Adhyaksha, Sachiv and Up-Sachiv. In addition to these office bearers there are 17 members (sadasya) in the central committee. Below the central committee is the regional committee, which is constituted of four office bearers—Adhyaksha, Up-Adhyaksha, Sachiv and Up-Sachiv. The gram committee is the basic unit of the organisation. It is constituted of four office bearers—Adyaksha, Up-Adhyaksha, Sachiv and Koshadhyaksha. The Patel of the village is included in the committee in advisory capacity.

Since its inception the organisation strived to achieve self-sufficiency to escape dependence of donor agencies. The organisation was to be run on a membership fee of Rs. 50/- annually. The membership fee was to be collected by the Koshadhyaksha and then handed over to the central committee to conduct its annual calendar of activities.

In pursuance of the logic to promote local initiative and decentralised form of politics the AMS has helped in the formation of other organisations in West Nimar and Khandwa, viz. (i) Jagrit Adivasi Sangathan, (ii) Adivasi Ekta Sangathan and (iii) Adivasi Kisan Sangathan. AMS is also associated with organisations with national network such as Bharat Jan Andolan, National Front for Adivasi self-rule of Azadi Bachao Andolan, and All India Coordinating Forum of the Adivasi/Indigenous Peoples.

Sendhwa, where the AMS is active, though being an adivasi area, is also an important commercial centre where the adivasi community is juxtaposed with the affluent traders involved in trade of agro-products, forest products, transportation, liquor and money lending. The AMS identifies these groups in alliance with the government officials as the chief exploiters of the adivasi community. Furthermore, the AMS also identifies problems arising certain internal contradictions that besiege the adivasi community. Organisation’s documents repeatedly refer to the prevalence of conflicts amongst adivasis on tadi, ladi aur badi (wine, women and land). Identification of these combinations of internal and external causes structure AMS’s understanding of adivasi exploitation. Consequently, its list of activities incorporate issues relating to exploitation of the adivasi by the non-adivasi community involved in trade of liquor, forest, money lending, etc. as well as programmes for removing the contradictions within the adivasi community.

In the words of Mr. Nikunj Bihari Butia, one of the founding members of AMS, Swadeshi, Swawalamban aur Swabhiman (self –production, self-reliance and self-respect) are the three core issues/slogans of the AMS. According to him unity (amongst individuals), fraternity (amongst the adivasis as a whole) and an alternative development paradigm are the other important planks of the AMS. In fact critique of the paradigm of development is one the important ideological planks of the AMS. The organisation is against the current developmental paradigms since they result in the wholesale displacement of adivasi/indigenous people and alienates them from their traditional habitat, culture and rights resulting in the utter degradation of their lives.

The aims and activities of the AMS can be roughly listed under six heads:

1. Social reform of tribal community involving (a) anti-liquor campaign, (b) eradication of obscurantist ideas, and (c) settlement of feuds involving members of the adivasi community.
2. Matters related to landed property (individual & customary) of adivasis, including issues of land alienation etc.
3. Creation of institutions of economic self-reliance for adivasis, such as credit society etc.
4. Efforts to restore self-esteem of the adivasis.
5. Environmental issues, which also highlight rights of the adivasi over the forest and its products.
6. Campaign for adivasi self-rule.

Amongst these objectives, those under the heading 1 and 2 are concerned primarily with the eradication of the contradictions within the adivasi community. The rest of the aims and objectives are primarily concerned with the eradication of exploitation of the adivasi at the hands of the non-adivasis. In order to get a clear picture of the activities undertaken under the two heads it will be necessary to briefly elaborate upon the activities undertaken to eradicate the internal contradictions of the adivasi community as well as those under taken to prevent their exploitation at the hands of the outsiders.

Activities undertaken to eradicate the internal contradictions:

AMS documents are explicit on the existence of certain traditional sources of conflict within the adivasi community. The most chronic amongst them, according to the AMS, are infighting amongst the adivasis over women, land and alcohol. AMS documents suggest that most of these fights are related to alcohol. Other than these sources of strife the AMS sees the prevalence of obscurantism as a malice afflicting the tribal society. Having identified these as the most prominent internal contradictions the AMS seeks to eradicate them through a two pronged strategy: one of containment and second of eradication.

In order to contain the conflicts amongst the adivasis and to keep it within manageable limits the AMS has taken recourse to the traditional institutions of mediation, which amongst other things also includes imposition of fine. However, the efficacy of this intervention is increasingly coming under question. Locus standi of the AMS, in such interventions, has been questioned since some of their activists are non-adivasi. More importantly, from the available documents it becomes clear that in controversies involving Patels, i.e. those with political and economic clout, decisions of local mediating body is flouted or overturned by recourse to modern juridical apparatuses viz. police, courts, etc. or by use of political and money power. The efficacy of the traditional modes of resolution is increasingly failing in conflicts over land and political power. This is highlighted in the failure of the traditional mechanism in resolving the conflict between Bhim Singh Patel and his brother Dongal Singh over land. Similarly the political tussle between Jhagadia Patel and Rema of Kabri village could not be resolved.

Other than these efforts at managing conflict emerging over land and political clout the AMS has also attempted to check the recurrence of conflicts over alcohol and women. The AMS has initiated a series of activities that can be categorised as social reform activities. To prevent conflicts over alcohol anti-liquor campaign is included as an important activity in the itinerary of the AMS. To prevent conflicts over women and to end obscurantism, which has been identified by the AMS as significant contradictions within the adivasi community, the organisation has launched campaigns against obscurantism. They hope to thereby improve the position of women by gradual spread of progressive ideas amongst the adivasi community. It needs to be mentioned here, however, that some of the campaigns for women’s rights had to be dropped since they did not sit easily with the insistence of the AMS to restore the traditional adivasi system. The campaign against purdah is one such instance. While there is enough evidence that purdah system has non-adivasi roots yet the adivasi community in West Nimar does not regard it as an outside influence. Thus, the AMS had to drop the campaign.

These activities of the AMS relate it to certain other organisations active in the area of ‘social reform’ such as the Gayatri Parivar and the Radha Swami Sect. These organisations have been working for the eradication of alcoholism, non-vegetarianism and adivasi rituals such as bride price. The adivasi converted to this cult considers them self to be more civilized than their brethren and their cultural practices, rituals as well as norms and values are different from other adivasis. Strict codes of non-vegetarianism, abstinence from alcohol etc. makes it impossible for the convert of the sects to participate in traditional rituals such as Indal or Deepawali where liquor is consumed and a goat is sacrificed respectively. Furthermore, the members of the Gayatri Parivar wear a holy thread (Je-nev-oo) and call themselves Brahmins and perform ‘havans/yagnas’ (oblations in sacred fire).

It is pertinent to point out here that not only the social reform activity of the AMS is in a continuum with that of the Gayatri Parivar and the Radha Swami Sect but also some of its activists and leaders are members of these cults. For e.g. Barku Bhai, mukhia of AMS in Hingua; Rajaram Kirade, mukhia of AMS of Matiyamail; and Mukesh Bhai, mukhia of AMS of Deoli; all are members of the Radhaswami sect. Similarly, Vanraj Singhoria, President/chairman of AMS; Damania Bhai; and Rajaram Bhai, sarpanch of Jhiree Jhamli are members of Gayatri Parivar. These activists and leaders feel that their membership to the sect helped their organisational activities for the AMS. In his interview during the fieldwork Mr. Vanraj Singhoria stated that almost 75% of the activists of the AMS in Jhiree Jhamli belonged to the Gayatri Parivar. According to Mr. Vanraj, he brought them to the organisation. He was successful in doing so since all of them belonged to the same cult.

Certain other organisations that are political rivals of the AMS, such as the RSS are also active in this area with their version of the ‘sanskritisation’ agenda, which also include campaign against liquor.

Activities undertaken to eradicate the exploitation by the non-adivasis:

As mentioned earlier, Sendhwa is an important centre of commerce for primary products. It is one of the largest cotton markets in the country. It is also a centre for forest products such as timber. These commodities are obviously catering to markets far beyond the local boundaries. Alongside these Sendhwa is also an important cattle market that caters primarily to the local needs. Due to this commercial character of Sendhwa, there is a significant presence of non-tribal element primarily in the trans-regional trading sector. Thus we find powerful non-tribal interest groups in cotton, timber and money-lending sector. Consequently, despite being an adivasi district, the tribal population is juxtaposed with a more developed, articulate and affluent non-tribal population.

The AMS sees in this juxtaposition the roots of the exploitation of the adivasi. The AMS provides a very compelling reason and narrative of this exploitation. Suffice is to say that the Through its intervention it seeks to counter the mutually reinforcing and parasitic network of interests that is exploiting the adivasi community. Based on the activities of the various vested interest groups the AMS has identified four interrelated sites/sources of adivasi exploitation:
1. Cotton market: Where the adivasis are underpaid due to manipulation of weight and measures.
2. Cotton production: Being a cash crop it requires the adivasi to advanced variety of seeds and fertilizers, thus increasing the dependency of cash starved adivasi society on moneylenders—leading to indebtedness amongst adivasis.
3. Forest: Pillage of forest resources due to the activity of the timber mafia and the forest officials.
4. Corruption by government officials: Bribes to the local administration, police, forest department and banks is a serious drain on the meagre resources of the adivasi.

The AMS has a detailed programme to counter these major sites/sources of exploitation that it has identified. We will begin with agriculture and the selling of agricultural products. To safeguard the interest of the adivasis the AMS has waged a sustained, and to great extent successful, battle to end corruption and manipulation of weights and measures at the cotton market. This has helped the adivasi producer claim its rightful remuneration.

Dependence on modern high yield seeds and fertilizers, an inevitable by product of commercialisation of agriculture, has made the adivasi excessively reliant on moneylenders. Their vulnerability is further increased due to the non-availability of less exploitative source of money. The mode of functioning of the existing banks is almost akin to traditional moneylenders. It is pertinent to recall the alleged murder of an adivasi of Pati block by the employees of the District Sahkari Bank for recovery of loan. In order to reduce the dependence of the adivasi on moneylenders the AMS has adopted a two-pronged approach. First, it has collaborated with the Kasturba Swadeshi Krishi Kendra to develop and educate the adivasi about traditional methods of cultivation that are more cost effective and cheap than the modern cultivation foisted by the imperatives of commercialisation of agriculture. Adoption of such methods is aimed at reducing the dependence of the adivasi on money. Second, the organisation also attempted, albeit briefly, to establish and run a thrift and credit society managed by the adivasis to decrease the dependence of the adivasi on the moneylenders and the bank. Running the thrift society however ran into several insurmountable logistical problems.

The efforts of reduce the dependence of the adivasi on commercial interests gained urgency when Monsanto started the efforts to introduce Bt. Cotton in Khargone. In 1999 trial of Bt. Cotton was initiated in village Mohammad Pura, tehsil Burhanpur and village Kithud tehsil Badwa. The organisation is acutely aware that introduction of this seed will affect traditional cotton biodiversity and increase the dependence of farmers on a multi-national company. As a part of their efforts to block the entry of Bt. Cotton one of the activists of the organisation (Nikunj bhai) along with Mr. Afsat H. Jafri (of Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology, New Delhi) visited Kithud village and surveyed the progress of this ‘trial run’ of the Bt. Cotton terminator seeds.

To secure the rights of the adivasi on forest resources, prevent illegal felling of tree and exaction of bribes by the forest officials, the AMS has made environmental issue as one of its central agenda. This agendum has a double point of emphasis. On the one hand the AMS seeks to educate the adivasi population of the environmentally disastrous consequences of deforestation (this is especially significant for Khargone where the adivasi population is dependent of forest resources for subsistence; if the forests are destroyed it will lead to further depletion of the resources available to them.) On the other hand the organisation has repeatedly emphasised the rights of the adivasi community over forest and its products. The first point of emphasis seeks to educate the adivasi of the necessity and urgency to prevent illegal felling of trees by the timber mafia. The second point of emphasis seeks to educate the adivasi community of their rights and provide them with knowledge and moral conviction to resist illegal exactions by the forest officials, who force the adivasi to pay bribe for using forest resources that rightfully belongs to them.

Government officials, because they control the administrative machinery, succeed in exacting bribes from the adivasi. This does not only provide political power to the officials but also gives them unfettered control over natural and public resources. In a third world country such as India where a large section of the population is economically poor, politically powerless and betray total ignorance of their rights, unfettered control over administrative machinery allows the government officials to behave like feudal lords. They exact bribes for personal gains as if they were ‘taxes’ and ‘duty’ that the adivasi has to pay to use the resources within their administrative jurisdiction. In short lack of control over the administrative machinery is the chief reason for the exploitation of the adivasi at the hands of the government officials. Consequently, efforts to politically empower the adivasi are prominent in the agenda of the AMS. To achieve this the AMS has been striving for the establishment of the adivasi self rule.

The theme of adivasi self rule is reflected in an all-embracing slogan Apne gaon mein apna raj (our rule in our villages). Tribal self-rule for the AMS is a means of decentralisation through the revival of decision-making bodies of the village. These institutions are recognised by the state in their capacity of institution of conflict resolution in disputes involving adivasis. The AMS has been striving for the establishment of elected bodies at the village level called the gram sabha. This body could be provided jurisdiction over policy formulation. The AMS has carried on a sustained effort at holding gram sabhas but is yet to achieve the desired results. It is significant that this particular effort towards swavalamban is inspired by the umbrella organisation—The Bharat Jan Andolan. The AMS stresses that the link between the two organisations are merely ideological.

Politicians, since they are directly involved in patronising various mafias and corrupt officials, are believed to be discredited in the eyes of the common people. Consequently, the AMS has consciously decided to avoid participating in any contest for political posts. In fact they abstain from taking any overtly ‘political’ position of supporting any mainstream political parties during election. Instead, they concentrate their efforts for uplifting the adivasi and preventing their exploitation at the hands of the moneyed interests. In other words they seem to operate in the non-parliamentary space of politics that has been valorised as the only space of true politics by the radical left and the non-statist Gandhians.

Social base of the organisation:

The social base of the organisation is predominantly amongst the Barelas—a sub-tribe of the Bhils. Socially and economically the Barela is a relatively well off adivasi group and its social and economic position is second only to the Bhilalas. There is very little base amongst the more marginal groups such as the Bhils or the adivasi harijans. The only exception to this (during the period of the fieldwork) was in Amli where a Bhil phaliya in the village are members of the AMS. Base amongst the more affluent Bhilalas is also non-existent amongst the scores of activist and sympathisers we could find only one supporter Mr. Dinesh Solanki, who is differently abled (poliomyelitis in both legs) and kept accounts for the AMS in 1999, belongs to the Bhilala community.

The leadership of the AMS, like its social base, is predominantly Barela. Furthermore, they belong to the relatively well-off and landed sections of the Barela community. Of the nine adivasi office bearers of the AMS, eight were Barela and of them five were landowners. Only three were landless. Of the adivasi office bearers only one was a woman. One of the reasons for the preponderance of landholders in the leadership is that to begin with relatively well off adivasis joined the organisation. Sumli Bai the landless women leader was also one of the founding members. However, as the movement progressed, some landless adivasis rose to the position of leadership. The year 1993 witnessed a dramatic expansion in its membership, in the aftermath of the Kunjri Sammelan; also saw the induction of two landless labourers Moti Ram and Gend Ram who later rose to the position of leadership. Moti Ram is the Mukhiya of Ojhar and Gend Ram is one of three full time members of the organisation.

Another peculiarity of the social base of the AMS is that an overwhelming majority of its activists and leadership are connected to agriculture. However, in 1997 some efforts have been made to organise the seasonal workers to the local mills. Nimar Mazdoor Sangh was set up by two Muquddams (labour agents) Har Das from Achli village and Ramesh from Chatli village. The area of operation of these Muquddams was Balsamudr, Dalsamanda, Chatli, Kheri and Achli, which is mostly a cotton/groundnut growing belt. This now is the area of activity of Nimar Mazdoor Sangh. The Mazdoor Sangh, however, is as of now not functioning like a formal trade union. Since its support base is primarily between adivasi workers, who have a temporary tenure, it is difficult to operate as a formal trade union. Furthermore, the Nimar Mazdoor Sangh has forged no links with the established trade union bodies the All India Trade Union Congress (INTUC) or the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC).

In an effort to expand its base amongst those sections of adivasis that were hostile to the AMS the organisation made deliberate efforts to woo them by offering them position of responsibility in the organisation. One of the strategies was to make owners of liquor shops the adhyaksha at the village level. This effort did not always succeed, as people do not always give up on profit generating business. Yet in spite of all its drawbacks and false starts the organisation has not only succeeded in raising the political consciousness and social awareness of the adivasi, it has also succeeded in making adivasi self-respect as one of the major issue of political mobilisation.

Ironically, it is this that has won over the support and admiration of some of its adivasi opponents. The case of Giyarsi Lal Rawat bears testimony to this. Mr. Rawat is the member of Congress and was the local MLA in the 1990’s. He was a target of AMS political ire due to his reported involvement in timber smuggling in the Warla area. This not only led to sullying of his reputation but also considerable financial loss since his trucks were impounded. Owing to organisational rivalry between the Congress and the AMS and his personal antagonism Mr. Rawat supported the Adivasi Samaj Sudhar Shanti Sena when it was formed in June 1997. However, when following the Kabri incident the state administration started hounding the AMS from August, 1997 and was on the verge of dealing a mortal blow to the organisation in September-October, 1997 Mr. Rawat stood in support of the AMS, he spoke of adivasi pride and called for an end to the persecution of the adivasis. Similarly, Rajendra Motiyani, a non-adivasi, a local Congress notable and the mentor of Mr. Rawat stood by the AMS during its period of crisis much to the chagrin of local power brokers within the congress.

Mobilisation tactics:

The AMS makes elaborate use of local cultural forms for mobilisation and highlighting issues. These include coining catchy slogans. For instance to popularise the abstract concept of village self-rule (Gram Sabha) they have coined a slogan that is brief, catchy and intelligible: Hamara Gaon Hamara Raj (Our Village Our rule). Similarly local folk traditions and songs are used both for propaganda and mobilisation. Political rallies almost resemble social gatherings were people arrive in colourful attire along with rice/jowar and firewood for community cooking. (See photo) Padyatras, one of the legacies of anti-British mobilisations in the area has also been extensively used. Certain traditional religious forms are also adapted for political mobilisation. The AMS has used the form of kavad to raise the awareness of the adivasis on issues involving rights to land water and forest. The success of these measures can be gauged from the fact that unlike the rallies of political parties the adivasis attend AMS rallies without the inducement of food, tickets, money and liquor. On the contrary the adivasis make nominal contributions for the AMS rallies and meetings and bring their own rice, jowar and firewood.

Yet the initial success of the AMS was not only the result of the forms of mobilisation. It was as much a result of political tactics. In its initial period rather than taking up large ideological issues that are difficult to clinch the organisation took small practical issues that not only affected the daily life of the adivasi but also were easier to clinch. This not only helped the organisation in developing live and practical contact amongst the adivasi community but also boosted the political morale of its cadre in the event of every successful campaign. Water, education and corruption of patwaris were the first issues taken up by the organisation. Twenty-eight villages were surveyed for availability of drinking water/hand pumps. Mobilisation on this met with some success. In fact all its initial agitation were based on specific issues such as nawad, debt and mortgage and cheating and manipulation of weights in the market place. The demands were however, raised for the entire area of Sendhwa rather than a specific village.

The tactical ploy paid dividends and as per the organisation records the organisation membership role swelled to 1000-1500 in a short period of one year between 1992-93. By 1995-96 the organisation had reach in most of the villages in Sendhwa and Khargone. It was now that the organisation focused on ideological issues in a big way. On 16th November 1996 a huge rally was organised for adivasi self-rule (gram sabha) at Khargone. As per the organisations estimate almost 80000 (eighty thousand) people attended the rally. This was the peak of popularity of the AMS; the organisation at this point of time had some 50-60 full time activists.

A very important reason for the increase in the popularity of the organisation was due its attempt to develop organisational synergy with similar organisation. The year 1993 is a turning point of the organisation since it marked the period of rapid mobilisation. It is important to note that this was also the year when the AMS forged ideological and tactical links with other organisations. In a meeting indigenous people in Bihar in 1993 the leadership of the organisation came in contact with Bharat Jan Andolan that resulted in ideological bonding between the two. In fact the organisations emphasis on swablamban appears to be inspired by the Bharat Jan Andolan led by Mr. B.D. Sharma.

Equally important was the Kunjri Sammelan, a landmark meeting of People’s Movements from ten states of India, held between January 17-19, 1993, at Kunjri in Madhya Pradesh. This meeting went a long way in spreading awareness amongst the adivasis in Sendhwa and Khargone and also enhancing the reputation of the AMS as a reputed organisation of the adivasis with influential links all over the country. The meeting had a lasting impact on several adivasis who later joined the organisation and became its important functionaries. Moti Ram and Gend Ram who joined the organisation in 1993 and were in 1999 (during the fieldwork) amongst the important leaders of the organisation recounted the significance of this meeting in establishing the organisation amongst the adivasi community.

The organisation spread rapidly till mid-1997, however, following the Kabri kand, the killing of Jhagadia Patel (an important leader of the Adivasi Samaj Sudhar Shanti Sena) and subsequent terror unleashed by the police including the custodial death of Kalia (an activist of the AMS) , the organisation has suffered a serious setback. During 1999 when fieldwork was conducted in the area there was little organisational activity. Ever since the Kabri Kand in August 1997 there had been no meeting in Khutwadi. Decline in activities has had a concomitant decline in membership. From a peak of 50-60 full time activists in 1995-96, in 1999 the organisation had only around 12 activists of which three were full time activists. There was also a geographical constriction of the base of the AMS. This can be borne out by the list of activists and the area of their activity:
Full time activists—Gajanan Bramhne (Chatli village), Gend Ram Dawar (Segbi village) and Sumli Bai (Khutwadi). Other activists: Moti Ram (Ojhar village), Khum Singh (Kusmia village near Nevali), Choga Lal (Kunjri village) [all in Sendhwa]; Maeta Bhai, Tukaram, Bhuna Bhai [all in Pati Block]; Raini Bhai, Gopal Bhai, Khum Singh [Cha Charia block, very weak chapters of the AMS].

This sudden collapse in the face of state aggression even at a period when the organisation was making rapid gains requires analytical enquiry.

Specific forms of exploitation of the adivasis and its impact

Forms of exploitation: Bhils and their sub-tribes have been opened up for exploitation since the medieval period. In the 10-11th century when the Rajputs entered the Bhil areas, in the 13th century Alla-ud-din Khalji, subsequently the Moghuls and in the 18th century when the Marathas began to occupy Central India. This period witnessed the emergence of a relationship between the conquerors and Bhils based on tributes and services that culminated in the development of the chakrani system. This system affixed hereditary services (both material and ritual) based on birth on different tribes. These services linked the adivasis in an unequal relationship. In return of their services the person is accorded some benefits.

Some studies are available on the functioning of the chakrani system. In an anthropological study on the Bhilkhera village in West Nimar the functions and benefits attached to different services are elaborated. Patel is the post of the village headman; he is also the ritual head of the village. He also helps the government officials during their visit and collects land revenue from the villages. As remuneration he gets 6.25% of the land revenue. The post of Patel in the Bhilkhera village has been continuing in a Bhilala village for past several years . Similarly the post of chowkidar is retained in a Nahal Mankar family. For the performance of his duty he was allotted a plot of tax-free land. In British and post-British India the modern administrative apparatus was superimposed on this pre-existing chakrani system, for instance in the Padalya village (a tribal village in Maharashtra that borders MP), Narawan Balai was the chakran. He was allotted 15 bighas of land without tax. He was also assisting the government officials with the chowkidari. Similarly the Patel also functions as a semi-government official and maintains law and order in the village with the help of the local officials.

Almost simultaneously with the intrusion of the invaders from the 9-10 century onwards came in money economy. The moneylenders entered even in the interior tribal villages. The grip of the moneylenders strengthened through the length and breadth of Bhil country and led to the origin of a system of debt bondage. This system was known as Sagri in Rajasthan, Halia in Gujarat and Naukarya in Madhya Pradesh. Even though the system got elaborated in the early medieval period it has continued un-interrupted till now. During our fieldwork one of the office bearers of AMS Mr. Moti Ram related that he had worked as a ‘Naukar’ of a Bania (Ballab Das Aggarwal). He worked in his fields and did all the chores related to agriculture—ploughing, harvesting and storing seeds. For this backbreaking work he was paid Rs. 5500/- (five thousand five hundred only) per annum.

During the British period the penetration of the intruders in Bhil area as well as that of moneylenders increased manifolds. British interests in commercialisation of agriculture especially in the 1860-70’s for production of cotton that farmers from Maharashtra were settled in the Bhil areas of Rath (Rath forms the greater part of Alirajpur and Jobat tehsils of Jhabua district, Madhya Pradesh). Inducement of debt was also used to encourage cotton production. The plight of the Bhils under debt bondage and dispossession is also noted by Dhebar Commission (1961:11) that states, “A large number of Bhils who have no land, have migrated to nearby towns as labourers. Economic destitution has led some of them (Bhils) to work under a system of bonded labour by which not only they but the members of their families are pledged to render service to redeem their debts.”

As per the recommendations of the various commissions for ameliorating the conditions of the co-operative banks were set up. However, this did not result in securing the rights of the Bhils since the procedure for obtaining loans from the bank is slow and complicated and securities are demanded which the Bhils are not able to furnish. Furthermore with the penetration of money in the Bhil social life and custom, etc. the requirement of money is not restricted to agriculture. However, the bank loans are restricted to needs connected with the farm; they are not granted to help out in personal needs. Unlike the banks and the government co-operatives the moneylender readily offers loans without any formalities and complicated paper works. Further more, they maintain personal contacts with the adivasi and are frequently living in the same area, speak the local dialect and understand the family and cultural background for the required loans. Thus the grip of the moneylender amongst the Bhils continues to be strong.

A few words of explanation on the category of moneylender, in the adivasi area money lending is not necessarily a distinct occupational category. The major source of cash has always been the bania in the village. In fact one can find their presence in even the most obscure villages. But they are not the only source of loan to the adivasi. The liquor seller or even the flourmill owner practices money lending. The Jewellery Shop owners also lend money. The category of moneylender, therefore, is a very broad one. All those who indulge in this practice, however, share some traits. Money is lent at very high rates and recourse is taken into duping the adivasi into paying much more than the required sum.

The twin onslaught of the intrusion of the outsiders and money had an inter-related but apparently contradictory impact on the Bhils. There is enough documentation and studies that show that with the penetration of the Rajputs and the subsequent invaders the Bhils were disposed of land (if not entirely at least of better quality land). Ironically, this twin pressure also resulted in tying the Bhils to land. Competition over land from the intruders and the increased need of money in the Bhil economy resulted in the shift from food gathering, hunting and shifting cultivation economy to settled agriculture. In his study on the Bhils of Dangs, Furer Haimendorf has stated that basically the Bhils were a tribe of food-gatherers and slash and burn cultivators. Now, however, a majority of Bhils practice settled agriculture.

Dispossession of adivasi land took three principal forms. The first was of by military invasion in the medieval period. In this period force of arms played the dominant role in pushing the Bhils off their land. The dominant intruders took possession of the better cultivable lands. The Bhils were pushed into interior forests where land for cultivation is sparse and scarce. The second form was under the British, who where propelled by the imperative of commercialisation of agriculture and the need for cotton during the period of the American civil war, farmers from Maharashtra were settled in the Bhil areas of Rath (Rath forms the greater part of Alirajpur and Jobat tehsils of Jhabua district, Madhya Pradesh). The third form is the most contemporary where dispossession of adivasi land is going on through a more round about way of indebtedness. In fact, Stephen Fuchs’ study on Jhabua shows that entirely as a result of indebtedness that has led to the transfer of the best fields to the non-adivasi.

The above picture seems to confirm to Rey’s evaluation of the different forms adopted in different stages of the opening up of an adivasi community for exploitation. According to Rey the role of state in opening up the adivasi community is short and transitional when force is required to break open the adivasi community so that money can take roots within it. Once money takes root the autarky of the old production community is shattered and they are automatically forced to sell their products and labour. Geschiere has opposed this stage wise analysis of the role of the state and had argued that the state continued to play significant role ensure the continued subordination of the adivasi community. We had argued that Marx had theoretically argued against this stage wise diminishing of the role of the state in reproducing exploitation. The existing literature and our field work confirms that even after money took roots in the Bhil community and indebtedness became one of the primary means of transfer of land from the adivasi to non-adivasi, the role of the state in facilitating this transfer is crucial.

Our field work, further, confirms the continued role of state in articulating the adivasi social formation with feudalism and capitalism we find that the forms that state adopts in maintaining the articulation is primarily non-formal and extra-legal. Unfortunately, Geschiere overlooks this dimension of states activity. While elaborating the forms of states intervention, Geschiere identifies three distinct forms :
1. Propaganda and indirect coercion.
2. Formation of market boards that always fixed prices below the market value of commodities so that the boards were left with a gigantic surplus.
3. Formation of co-operatives to control production and monopolise purchase of products.
In the Bhil areas too we find such formal interventions by the state. In the 1970’s the Maharashtra Cotton Federation was formed, which fixed the cotton prices. However, since the prices were below the prevailing market rates the cotton producers began selling their products in Sendhwa. This resulted in the rise of Sendhwa not only as an A-grade Krishi Upaj Mandi (KUM) but also a centre for industries based on cotton such as ginning mills and oil pressing mill of cotton seeds.

We find similar interventions by the state in the area of land alienation. In 1960 a land enactment was promulgated. Under 170 (b) of the Revenue Act of the constitution of India Adivasi land may not be sold/mortgaged to non-Adivasi and all land of the Adivasis, thus alienated after 1960, would be restored back to them. These interventions may appear as paternalistic measures by the state to secure the rights of the adivasi. Yet they have resulted in the adivasi getting even more marginalized. How does one take account of this paradoxical effect of state’s intervention? Stephen Fuchs suggests that the continued transfer of the land of the adivasi community to the non-adivasi is the result of the loopholes in the land enactment of 1960. He further opines that such loopholes can be found in every law. However, he does not dwell upon the structural implication of the existence of loopholes in every law.

Here the work of Meillassoux is of particular interest. He had indicated that maintaining rotating migration is on the chief ways that capitalist countries ensure a perpetual supply of chief labour force from ‘domestic community’. Meillassoux further argues that this rotating migration is ensured by of a series of ideological and policy measures such as racism, xenophobia, temporary residence or work permit in conjugation with turning blind eye to illegal immigration etc. Meillassoux argues that deployment such stated and un-stated measures “leave the immigrant worker vulnerable to the hazards of police, administrative and employers’ control and make it easier to fix their length of stay in accordance with the needs of economy”. Meillassoux, thus, emphasises that while reading state policies one cannot simply take recourse to ad-hoc arguments such as that of pointing out loopholes in a policy. Instead, Meillassoux claims that there is a structural logic that can be seen in the deployment of the combination of state policies and un-stated activities of the state.

Three conclusions can be drawn from Meillassoux’s analysis:
1. That state policies are there to increase the control of the state over the ‘domestic community’ (i.e. in our case adivasi community).
2. That these policies have the function of strengthening the logic of economy.
3. That in order to understand the structural logic of state policies we have to study them thematically, i.e., study policies dealing with a particular issue in their connectedness.

Since here we are trying to understand the Land Enactment of 1960, in order to understand the ways in which it acts in cementing the articulation of the adivasi social formation with capitalism we will have to read it with other policies that impact on the land rights of the adivasi community. The Land Enactment of 1960, though it is promulgated to safeguard the land rights of the adivasi, however permits it under certain circumstances. Under 170 (b) of the act, that calls for the restoration of all land alienated from the adivasis after 1960, also mentions that the land can be alienated if special permission is acquired. This act is accompanied with two other important legal promulgations. The first is that on the event of the death of an adivasi his legal heir acquires the title to the land only if the patwari transfers the land in his name. The second is that the forest officials have the power to determine that whether the land reclaimed from forest for cultivation (nawad) is valid or not. Under a provision of the Forest Conservation (Amendment) Act of 1988 adivasis could be evicted from forestland. The net result of these policies is that not only the control of the state over the land right of the adivasis is established, but also this allows for possibilities of manipulating the Land Enactment of 1960 thus enabling the continued transfer of adivasi land to the non-adivasis.

Provisions of these laws together with patent illegality are used to enable continued alienation of adivasi land. In our fieldwork we found evidence of this on several occasions. We will briefly elaborate some of the typical cases to make our point. We found that indebtedness is one of the main causes of land transfer. However, this is possible on such a large scale because of manipulations in the mutation of the ownership records. Through these manipulations the land is transferred in stages from an adivasi to a non-adivasi. Since transfer of land from adivasi to non-adivasi is not permitted land is first transferred to a pliant adivasi thus making the non-adivasi a benami holder of land . In some case then land is mutated to the non-adivasi in lieu of some illegal gratification. In some of the villages in our field study land was also taken over by the forest department.

Several cases of manipulation in the mutation of the land records were narrated to us in the interviews conducted in the field. We will mention some of the cases that we came across in Ojhar. Gulal of Chaudharypura phalia of Ojhar sold 18 acres of his land for six thousand rupees (Rs. 6000/- only) to the Mahajan Basantilal. However, the land was registered in the name of Nahal Singh an adivasi of Bhorwada village. In the same village Mangilal sold twelve acres of land to Chotalal the oil merchant, which was registered in the name of another adivasi. (During the time of the fieldwork these transfers were being challenged in the court.) The extent of the corruption and official collusion in these land transfers can be gauged from a case that happened in the Chaudharipura phalia of Ojahr, some two years before the fieldwork. Here, Bhilala adivasi Situ owed the village mahajan Bansidhar Narayan some money. Mr. Narayan in order to recover the money got 16 acres of Situ’s land transferred to another adivasi Kandu by using an impersonator to pose as Situ. However, when the case came up the land was reverted back to Situ.

There are also cases when subsequent to the land being transferred from debtor adivasi to a pliant adivasi the moneylender gets the land mutated in his own name. In Ojhar Gal Singh owed the local merchant Punya a sum of four thousand rupees (Rs. 4000/- only) consequently in 1969 Gal Singh had to sell seven acres and sixty-seven deci. land to Nahal Singh, who was the merchant’s front man. However, in 1971 Punya got the land mutated in his own name. Under pressure in 1983 Punya once again transferred the land in the name of Nahal Singh but once again in 1988 the land was retransferred in his name. Gal Singh filed a case against Punya in 1995 but till mid January 1999 it was still going on. There are similar cases of land transfer in other villages AMS activists inform of 25 acres of land being restored to the adivasis due the efforts of the organisation in Borli and Jamli. The activists also mentioned cases where forest department took over adivasi land. In Sahapura the forest department set up plantations on 15 acres of adivasi land, however this was reverted when the AMS intervened. Similarly in Rupla, Khazan and Risla 32 acres were taken over by the forest department once again activists of the AMS successfully intervened in the case.

Thus, introduction of money creates the condition indebtedness that leads to alienation of land from the adivasi. Earlier we had demonstrated that introduction of money led to an inter-related but apparently contradictory process, while on the one hand it led to alienation of land from the adivasi community it also tied the adivasi to land. We demonstrated that owing to the twin intrusion of outsiders and money the Bhils gave up shifting agriculture and took to settled agriculture. In fact now we will demonstrate that the changes in the nature of agriculture is not only that of shifting from shifting agriculture to settled agriculture, but also of increasing emphasis of producing for the market. Thus we can argue that introduction of money not only leads to transfer of land but also leads to a significant transformation in the nature of agricultural production of the adivasis. However, before we go into the full implication of the penetration of money it will be pertinent to point out the reasons for the penetration of money in the adivasi community.

Money was introduced amongst the adivasi community, initially to pay tribute or taxes to the medieval or modern conquerors, it soon takes root in the adivasi exchanges as well. Money, that is always a scares commodity within the adivasi social formation and yet the primary medium for relationship and exchange with the dominant social formations, acquires a singular prominence and soon replaces the other totemic and symbolic goods as token and markers of exchange within the adivasi community. Totemic and symbolic goods are gradually replaced by money in ceremonies and ritual of marriage, birth, death, etc. In the Bhil areas the prominence that money has acquired can be gauged from the fact it has become the prime medium on which most important rituals are based. Several anthropological works state increasing importance of money in adivasi rituals.

In 1961 the Dhebar Commission states that bride price in Rajasthan was not less than Rs. 300/- (Rupees Three Hundred only). For West Nimar a very helpful table was prepared by Bishwa Bandhu Chatterjee in his study to analyse the Kasturba Kanya Ashram. This table becomes especially significant since it is conducted in villages where the Kasturba Kanya Ashram along with certain other organisations such as the Gayatri Parivar and the Radha Swamy Sect are influential. All these organisations have advocated against bride price. Yet in spite of this the table shows a secular increase in the quantum of bride price. Bishwa Bandhu Chatterjee concluded, “The most significant and unambiguous trend…is that the range or level of payment for dowry…has registered a systematic rise from pre-1965 to post-1965 period. It has increased anywhere from 50 to 100% or even more.” Once money takes root within the rituals of the adivasi community it also permeates other spheres of economic life as well. In fact it can be said that life becomes impossible without money.

Stephen Fuchs while studying the causes of land scarcity and land hunger amongst the Bhils of Jhabua indicates that cash becomes necessary in almost every aspect of Bhils life. From his account four prominent nodes can be detected in Bhils life that necessarily require money. The first that Stephen Fuchs indicates is that of agriculture, Bhils require money to purchase seeds, fertilizer, etc. In the case of cash crops the requirement of money goes up commensurately. Second, vagaries associated with agriculture in India such as drought, flood, death of bullocks, etc. Third, weddings, funeral feasts, caste trials, etc. Three, illness in the family. Four, addiction to alcohol that is prevalent amongst the Bhils. In fact Stephen Fuchs points to a state of affairs where by the adivasi community is perpetually short of cash and provisions. It is this perpetual need for money that the adivasi community takes to producing for the market.

In our area of study the adivasis are cultivating various crops meant for the market, viz., wheat, Soya bean, groundnut and cotton, etc . To see the increasing importance of production for market one can refer to the following table:
Crop Indigenous seed Hybrid Seed For Home Consumption For Sale in the Mandi
Soya bean X Yes X Yes
Cotton X Yes X Yes
Maize Yes X Yes X
Jowar Yes X Yes X
Urad Yes X Yes Some
Groundnut Yes X Yes (for oil) Yes
Wheat X Yes Yes Yes
Rice Very Scarcely Yes X Yes
Bajra X Yes Yes Yes
(Source: Interview with Sitaram Bhadle of Jhiree Jhamli)

The increasing importance of production for market is evident from the use of high yield hybrid seeds and the production of crops aimed primarily for the market, i.e., cash crops. The purpose of this shift is to earn the much needed cash, however, ironically rather than providing the adivasi community with additional cash the shift to production of cash crops increases the requirement of cash. Increased use of hybrid seeds results in greater requirement of fertilizers and water in cultivation. Cotton requires maximum irrigation, fertilizers and pesticides. Wheat also requires good irrigation (not as much as cotton) and fertilizers. Soya bean consumes a large quantity of fertilisers (but less than cotton), but its irrigation needs are quite less compared to cotton and wheat. Chana requires a lot of water. Jowar, urad and bajra, however, are grown with nominal irrigation (mostly rain fed) and do not require fertilizers or pesticides. All this makes agriculture increasingly capital intensive. Cost of production shoots up at every stage of production. The cost of hybrid seeds is quite exorbitant for the adivasi. In Chatli the farmers gave the following price for seeds.

Item Price of seed procured from the bania
Wheat Rs.1200/quintal
Soya bean Rs.l800/quintal
Ground nut (in season) Rs.1700/quintal
Ground nut (in summer) Rs.2800/quintal
Cotton Rs.400-500/800gms.
(Source: interview with Dara Singh Brahmane of Chatli)

This price list was also confirmed in an interview with Gendram Dawar the Mukhiya of Sendhwa and Bhagwanpura areas. Several adivasis who were present at the time of the interview corroborated the above rates too. Use of fertilizers and pesticides further enhances the requirement of cash. Cotton requires large quantities of pesticides and urea. Even in wheat cultivation around 50 kilograms of urea per acre is required. The cost of pesticides and urea (procured from the bania) in the first half of 1999 was Rs.200-300 per litre for pesticides and Rs. 202 per sack (50 kg.) for urea. Cost of cultivation also goes up due to the increased cost of irrigation. Fossil fuel being expensive the adivasis depend on electricity to irrigate their crops. However, the power supply is erratic and supplied voltage is too low (160 volts instead of the 240volts) to run the electric pumps. Consequently, the motors of the pumps used for drawing water for irrigation are often burnt out.

Finally production for the market compromises the food sufficiency of the adivasi community. This happens because of two reasons. First, increased cost of production of agriculture means that production of cash crops, rather than decreasing cash dependency of the adivasi community in fact increases it. Thus, need for cash keeps on increasing in the adivasi community further propelling production for market thus eroding the acreage under cultivation of subsistence crops. Production of subsistence crops is also adversely affected due to the change in the nature of soil owing to the use of fertilizers and excessive watering of the fields. Evidence of this was seen in Khutwadi. Khutwadi produces cotton. Although cotton was cultivated even earlier but now days a hybrid seed is used that requires fertilizers and pesticides (once every eight days). These fertilizers have adversely affected the jowar crop, since the use of the fertilizers the jowar crop does not ripen.

Thus, increased requirement of cash results in the change in the form of production in agriculture where by the adivasi community takes to production for the market to augment its supply of cash. However, this shift to production for the market only results in enhancing the requirement of cash in the adivasi community. Consequently, the dependence of the adivasi community on the saookar, bania and moneylenders increases. In fact now we find that an adivasi also starts borrowing to be able to cultivate cash crops. It leads to a particular kind of debt bondage. Production of cash crop requires on an average Rs.2500/- per acre. This money is procured in most cases from Aggarwals and banias. The moneylender not only charges an exorbitant rate of interest of 50% at quarterly rates. Hence if an adivasi borrows Rs.5000/- in June by harvest time in October/November it becomes Rs.7500/-. Furthermore, the debtor adivasi is obliged to sell his produce only to the moneylender or his representatives at the mandi. Thus production for market further increases the dependence of the adivasi community on the moneylenders.

Thus the result of the combined influences of enhanced requirement of money, increased production for the market and growing indebtedness of the adivasi community results in the rupturing of the autarky of the adivasi community and its greater insertion into the market. However, it needs to be pointed out here that this insertion of the adivasi community in the market does not mean that the adivasi social formation gets assimilated or dissolved in feudalism or capitalism. On the contrary this insertion is very specific whereby the adivasi social formation is locked in a subordinated position with the market based social formations (feudalism and capitalism). This specific relation then permits the extraction of products of adivasi social formation at a very cheap rate. Thus market, rather than becoming a space where adivasis are integrated in the money economy, becomes an asymmetrical space, which permits the extraction of cheap labour (in form of products) from the adivasi social formation. This happens because owing to their weak resource position the adivasis have at best an imperfect insertion in the market whereby every level of the market system is not available for their access. More importantly the moneyed interests, here the Aggarwals, banias, etc., control the levers of the market and manipulate it in fixing the prices etc., in their favour .

In the case of cash crops such as cotton this was seen in different mandis. At Balwadi the ‘Seths’ sell everything (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, grocery). Most of them have formed a cartel. They have kept alive the tradition of Aadat (auction) and control the prices artificially thus the adivasi gets short changed. Licensed merchants auction the cotton at Balwadi Mandi, but the buying merchants ‘fix’ the price. Although the weighing fee is Rs.10/- and the auction fee too is nominal, the auctioneer/dalal demands and receives 2% of the total sale of the produce. This surcharge of 2% and the cost of transporting their produce to the mandi become prohibitive for the adivasi. The result is that several adivasis to avoid paying this 2% have stopped taking their produce to the Balwadi mandi. Now the merchants buy the products directly from the village at rates that are Rs. 50-100/quintal cheaper than that at the mandi.

Asymmetrical structure and pricing in the market is evident in every transaction involving the adivasi and the outsiders. Stephen Fuchs mentions that the merchants buy the farm products of the adivasi at a cheap rate and sell their own merchandise at a higher rate (cf. fn. 104). Even though one disagrees with the theoretical reason forwarded by Stephen Fuchs for this one agrees with the empirical veracity of the statement. During the fieldwork we prepared a chart of the price difference in the products being sold by the adivasi and the merchants in the local mart at Segbi and the primary market in Sendhwa and found that the products of the adivasi was cheaper in the local mart while the products of the merchants were more expensive in the local mart relative to the primary market in Sendhwa. Since bulk of the adivasi community transacts mainly in the local mart it result in remittance of cheap labour (in the form of products) from the adivasi social formation.
Agricultural Products of the adivasi
Item Segbi mart Sendhwa KUM
Soya bean Rs.5/kg Rs.7-8/kg
Ground nut Rs.12-13/kg Rs.14/kg.
Cotton Rs.12/kg Rs.15/kg
Certain other food items that are not grown in Segbi are also more expensive in the local mart than in Sendhwa. Rice is not grown in Segbi. The cost of rice is Segbi is Rs.14/kg. In Sendhwa the same quantity and quality of rice costs Rs.11/kg.
Merchandise of the traders
Item Segbi Mart Sendhwa
Salt Rs.2.30/kg Rs.2/kg
Kerosene Rs.15/liter Rs.10/liter
Soap (Nirma) Rs.7/pack Rs.5/pack
Biscuits (Parle) Rs.6/pack Rs.5/pack
Clothes (shirts and trousers) Not available Rs. 300/pair
Baskets Rate variable More expensive here
Utensils Approx. Rs.75/wt. measure Approx. Rs.50/wt. measure
Ground nut oils Rs.60/liter Rs.50/liter


Alienation of resources, indebtedness and continuous remittance from the adivasi community owing to the asymmetrical nature of the market creates a massive resource deficit. The adivasi community is compelled to take recourse to exceptional methods. There are two prominent measures that the adivasi community takes to replenish its resource position: first, it attempts to increase its source of income by reclaiming land from forest. This process is called nawad. Second, the community in order to earn much needed cash takes to migration to seek cash base employment. Both these measures are taken recourse to in drastic proportions.

Nawad has been an emotive issue in the adivasi community and has been cashed by mainstream parties for electoral gains. The right wing Hindu party the Jana Sangh affiliated to the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh consolidated its electoral base in Sendhwa by supporting the issue of nawad. The extent of nawad can be gauged from the fact when the Congress government invited applications to regularise the nawad before 1980 lakhs of applications were filed. In Badwani 4074 persons filed application for 99,942.755 hectors of land. In Khargone and Sendhwa 93399 persons filed applications for regularisation of nawad. Similarly in Barwaha several hundred people filed for regularisation of nawad of which government accepted the regularisation of 60.223 hectors.

Migration is also resorted to on a regular basis to offset the cash crunch. From Chatli people go to work in the ginning/spinning mills at Sendhwa, which is 8 kms away from the village. For an adivasi migration to seek employment beings since the age of twelve. Entire families migrate to Sendhwa for work. Similarly from Sakad, which is 9 kms away from Sendhwa, entire families migrate to work in the spinning/ginning mills of Sendhwa. From Badwani Adivasis migrate to Bankaner, Dhar district, Maharashtra, to work in the mills. Even when at the time of the fieldwork we found two operational ginning mills in Badwani.

These measures are adopted to alleviate the resource crunch bearing upon the adivasi community. But these measures are akin to burning the candle from both the ends. Nawad though it increases the acreage under cultivation seriously depletes the availability of forest-based resources that are so crucial for the sustenance an adivasi family. Similarly migration in the non-agricultural season may gain some additional money for the adivasi family but it also deprives the adivasi community of able hands to replenish the resources such as repairing house, agricultural and other tools etc. that is crucial for the survival of the adivasi community as an economically viable entity.

This system, however, benefits the market based social formations immensely. Migration opens up a supply of very cheap labour. The adivasis migrating to work as seasonal labour in the ginning/spinning mills are paid very meagre salary. Adult male workers are paid Rs.42/- while female and children are paid Rs.37 per day for 12 hours a day schedule. The payment can be made on a daily or weekly basis. They have to work for 6 days a week without any breaks or half day. As is evident that this rate is far below the government prescribed rates. Migration does not only makes cheap labour available, there are cases where migration offsets the shortage of labour. Where if migrant adivasis were not there, it could have resulted in hike of wages. Bankaner that is situated in the Dhar district of Maharashtra abuts Badwani. During October-November i.e. the season, there is an acute labour scarcity in Bankaner. In the absence of availability of local labour the labour agents from Bankaner endeavour to direct migration of adivasi labour from Badwani to Bankaner. Labour agents of mill owners of Bankaner advance loans to the adivasis in the summer season when the adivasis are faced with severe financial crunch. These indebted adivasis are under the obligation to Bankaner to work for the mill owners in the cotton season in October-November.

The benefit of supply of cheap labour is compounded by the fact that the adivasi labour is employed as seasonal labour. Labour is required in the ginning/spinning mills for only four months in a year. The mill owners rather than appointing a permanent labour force opt for seasonal labour. They have encouraged the development of a temporary labour market. Indebted adivasis who have been working in the mills are obliged to provide more workers to the mill. These adivasis are called muqaddam (labour agent). A labour agent is bound to supply labour to a mill on weekly basis. In the course of our interviews we met Har Das of Achli village. Har Das is currently involved with the Nimar Mazdoor Sangh, but earlier was a muqaddam who used to supply labour from the cotton and groundnut belt of Balsamer, Dalsamanda, Chatli, Kheri and Achli.

Employment of labour on a seasonal or weekly basis means that the mill owners do not have to make provisions for maintaining the labour round the year. Thus the mill owners can afford to scale down the salaries and the adivasi labour has to depend on the adivasi community for maintenance for the period when he/she is not working in the mills. In other words while mill owners benefit from the cheap supply of labour, they spend nothing for its upkeep. The expenditure for the upkeep of the labour continues to be borne by the adivasi community. Thus the mill owner not only gets cheap labour but labour that does not require any additional expenditure for maintenance. (I have argued elsewhere that this leads to the double exploitation of the adivasi labour.) Seasonal employment of workers has political benefit as well since this makes formation of trade unions commensurably difficult. This is evident in the attempts of form Nimar Mazdoor Sangh, which faces an uphill task in organising since the labour is seasonal in nature, only four months in a year.

Impact of exploitation on socio-economic sphere: We have demonstrated above that in order to exploit the adivasi social formation it has first of all to be opened up. This was achieved by the series of invasions first by the Rajputs and subsequently by the Khalji, Mughals and Marathas. This military subjugation was followed by the imposition of tribute and taxes collected in cash or kind. Once cash was introduced in adivasi social formation it took roots in it and gradually replaced exchange and barter from cultural, ritualistic and economic relations. Thus first force and then cash opened up the adivasi community for exploitation. Cash gradually replaced military subjugation as the chief means for articulating the adivasi social formation with the succeeding feudal and capitalist (under the aegis of colonialism) social formations. Yet this does not mean that the role of the state in maintaining the subordinate articulation of the adivasi social formation. State policy measures, informal actions as well as patent illegality and corruption of the state functionaries and institutions continue to play a significant role in maintaining it.

Once adivasi social formation was opened up and thus articulated with the succeeding social formations special forms were deployed to enable continuous remittance of resources from the adivasi social formation. The chief object of this process is remittance is cheap labour and its products. We have demonstrated that in West Nimar cheap labour is withdrawn from the adivasi community by developing a temporary labour market and seasonal employment of adivasi labour in the ginning/spinning mills. Remittance of cheap products is ensured by asymmetrical structure of the market. Thus, the exploitation of the adivasis in West Nimar follows two distinct processes, first of opening up of the adivasi community and second deployment of specific forms to remit labour and resources from the adivasis. These specific forms are deployed to enable remittance are in consonance with the specific structure of the adivasi social formation.

Hence the process of exploitation has two distinct impacts: First of those transformations that are necessary to open up the adivasi community i.e. transformations in the internal structures of the adivasi community to break its autarky; second, to consolidate those aspects of the adivasi social formation that enable remittance of cheap labour and products. These two processes together determine the trajectory and direction of mutations within adivasi social formation when it is articulated with feudalism and capitalism. Amongst the Bhils these two transformations can be briefly stated as follows:
1. The process of opening up of the adivasi community by military conquest of the Rajputs, Khalji, etc. and by the introduction of cash in the community has led to increasing stratification within the community. This stratification is not only within individual adivasis (creation of rich and poor) but also between lineages that has resulted in the stratification of Bhils between Bhils, Barelas and Bhilalas. The bhilalas being the most influential and the Bhils the least. Furthermore, different clans of the Bhils, Barelas and Barelas are being placed increasingly into an unequal relationship.
2. The process of consolidation of the structures that enable remittance of cheap labour and products has led to the consolidation of the kinship structure and the position of the patriarch.

One of the logical corollaries of insertion of adivasi community in the market economy is emergence of stratification in the community. There are some latent asymmetries even in the adivasi community, as per Meillassoux the system of bridal exchange epitomised this latent asymmetry. But this asymmetry remained latent since in adivasi community channels and mechanism of redistribution existed. Once the autarky of the adivasi community is broken this mechanism of redistribution breaks down (on this more in a moment) and the latent asymmetry is actualised. Amongst the Bhils and its sub-tribes too such latent asymmetry existed both in the politico-economic and the cultural levels.

In the politico-economic levels power was unequally distributed, political power rests with the council of elders (roughly translated as panchayat) that is controlled by the headman. Amongst the Barela, Bhilala, Patelia, etc. the headman is called Patel. Amongst the Bhil the headman is called Tadvi. The post of the headman is hereditary. In larger villages every Phalia has its own headman. Besides the headman, there are few other positions of authority and respect. Among the Bhils, Bhopas or Dewalo is a religious person who acts as a priest, medicine man and witch finder. The Bhopas have a hierarchy; some are or a superior order than the rest. But all of them are seen as religious leader and are object of reverence, respect and also fear.

There are several privileges attached to the post of the headman. The headman presides over various religious and cultural rituals. He is given the responsibility to collect land revenue and gets 6.25% of the revenue as remuneration. He also has the right to distribute the land reclaimed from forest i.e. Nawad. All this vests considerable power in the hands of the Patel. In the present money based economy control over political and land resources has translated into relatively better economic position of the Patels. The economic and political position of the Patels is also consolidated due to the superimposition of modern political structure over that of the adivasi community. Patel now acquires as semi-government official status. He helps government officials during their visit and maintains law and order in the village with the help of other local officials. In this capacity the Patels develop close links with the local administration and the police. The PUCL report elaborates upon the close link between Mr. Jhagadia Patel and the police.

Consequently, the power vested traditionally in the hands of the Patels, etc. consolidates and creates the condition of increasing stratification in the adivasi community -- A condition that is further exacerbated by the insertion of the adivasi community in market economy. Overtime differences in resource position of the adivasis increase. Though the community still does not have a significant presence of landless adivasis, the fact is that now the landless labourers and adivasis with considerable land holdings, both appear at the opposite end of the spectrum. (There is a word of caution, however, degrees of affluence in adivasi community is less dramatic than in non-adivasi community since there is widespread indebtedness in the community even amongst landholders.) Bishwa Bandhu Chatterjee has prepared an interesting table with a sample base of nine villages.



Land Holding Patterns (acres per family)
Serial No. Village Land-less Upto 5 5-15 15-25 25-40 40-100 <100 Total Average size
1 Kusmiya 13 25 16 -- 1 1 -- 46 10.8
2 Zhakhar 14 13 17 7 4 -- -- 35 15.7
3 Jamniya 11 15 40 2 1 3 -- 62 12.7
4 Sulgaon 11 32 53 -- 1 -- -- 97 7.6
5 Mansor 1 18 26 2 2 -- -- 49 9.6
6 Mogrikheda -- 27 19 6 3 1 -- 56 10.6
7 Salon 15 35 23 1 4 -- 2 80 11.5
8 Chatly 3 41 45 14 2 -- -- 105 10.7
9 Kunjary 2 34 64 11 9 -- -- 120 10.9
Total 50 220 303 43 27 5 2 650
Total cases 50 270 573 616 643 648 650

The above table shows opening up of differentiation in resource position and emergence of a small section of landless families in the adivasi community and an even smaller section of rich peasants (however it has to be borne in mind that this table was prepared in the early 1970’s, during our field work we came across instances of landless labourers is Burapani, Segbi, Ojhar and Khutwadi). One of the corollaries of variation in land holding that sharecropping and agrarian labour has emerged in the adivasi community.

Though sharecropping is not as prevalent as self-labour yet sharecropping is also practised amongst the adivasis in this area. There are two types of sharecropping that are predominantly practised. In the first type the yield is divided into two equal parts after taking out the seeds. In this case, the sharecropper supplies the labour-force and other equipments needed for agriculture. The second type is called Batai or Teesari Pati. In this type the owner of the land provides all the agricultural implements required except labour. The owner of the land gets 2/3rd of the yield and the worker gets only 1/3rd of the yield. Incidence of landless labour is even less but exists none the less. Land less labour does all kinds of chores. Gend Ram Dawar, one of the prominent activists of the AMS is a land less labourer. He used to chop wood in the forest and also did odd jobs for a living. There are also incidences of deployment of landless labour in agriculture. We witnessed this in Jhiree Jhamli where landless adivasis work as agricultural labour. Agricultural labour is paid much below the official wages. The existing rates during the duration of the fieldwork were Rs.15-20 per day for harvesting and Rs.30-40 for ploughing. Unlike the wage structure at factory where men and women are paid different salary for same work, in agriculture both men and women are paid Rs.15-20 for harvesting. However, ploughing that fetches Rs.30-40 is done only by men.

Earlier we had stated adivasis acting as fronts to enable transfer of land to the non-adivasi. The incidence of sharecropping and employment of agricultural labour is a much more direct case of exploitation of adivasi at the hands of another adivasi. (It has to be borne in mind, however, that this is not very prevalent even now.) Other than the sphere of agriculture there are also evidences of this kind of exploitation in loan transactions. Anthropological studies demonstrate that in majority of loan transactions presence of a witness is mandatory. This witness is held responsible if loan is not returned. Advantage to the witness is that he also derives some benefit out of the deal. Many of the witnesses, who are Bhils themselves, exploit the other needy Bhils for whom they stand witness.

Invasion from more stratified social formations and penetration of money led to the disintegration of the Bhils into various independent groups and sub-groups. Certain clans and lineages that gained prominence owing to the contact with the invaders or due to better adaptation to money broke away from the main Bhil community and claimed independent identity. Furer-Haimendorf has indicated this process of assertion of independent identity by the Meenas. He shows that till as late as 1921 census Meenas were mentioned as Bhils, but since then has repudiated that identity. Similarly the Bhilalas emerged as a result of marital union between the Bhils and the Rajputs. They now repudiate all connection with the Bhils. These new groups enjoyed a better social status than the Bhils. Thus, invasions and penetration of money led to asymmetrical stratification of the Bhils that had very significant impact on the future course of development of these communities. It disrupted the relation of reciprocity between the sub-groups that at one time were clans of the larger Bhil community involved in a network of economic and social exchange. Tribute, taxes and rent exacted from the subordinate groups and unequal access to resources did not only create unequal relationship amongst the sub-groups it also created a condition were survival for the marginal groups is becoming increasingly nonviable. I will briefly elaborate upon these issues to better explicate the point.

Asymmetrical stratification of Bhils into sub-groups began with the advent of Rajputs. The Rajputs took women from the Bhil community that led to the creation of distinct sub-groups of Bhilalas, Patalia’s, etc. The superior sub-castes, due to their proximity with the Rajput rulers, had the right to exact tribute and levy labour or money rent on the other sub-groups. In turn they had to pay tribute to the ruling Rajput rulers called Darbar (royalty or prince). For instance the Bhil sub-groups that were created due to intermarriage with Rajputs could exact labour rent from the other Bhil groups. The Chaukhariya mankars were employed to bring drinking water and also to do other domestic chores during marriage and other social functions. The Nahal Mankars are engaged for grazing cattle, as labourer and as watchman. In return these superior sub-groups had to pay the darbar a fixed amount as a token of their allegiance. When Allauddin Khalji conquered this area and later on with the Mughal rule Muslim officials were posted in the region, some of who got married to Bhils, thus creating a new sub-group of Tadvi Bhils. The Muslim sub-groups of Tadvi Bhils and Nible reside in those parts of Satpura range that forms a hedge between the Narmada and the Tapti rivers. These Bhils claim descent from Pathan ancestry. The superior status of this sub-group vis-à-vis the Bhils is evident from the appellate Tadvi, which means headman.

This asymmetry between the sub-groups disrupted the patterns of exchange of products and labour between clans and lineages. The disruption of exchange of goods is relatively obvious. With the exaction of tribute and taxes the system of exchange as reciprocity, the chief basis of all exchange in adivasi social formation, is destroyed since now the movement of goods and money is unidirectional and obligatory. In the same vein exchange of labour is also disrupted. Adivasi social formation maintains the balance of labour supply through exchange of nubile women, adoption and birth control. Amongst these reciprocal exchange of women is one the chief ways of maintaining reciprocal exchange of labour force. However, with the emerging asymmetry amongst the Bhils and its sub-groups, this system gets disrupted. Marriage, dining, etc. between the sub-groups is stopped. The Bhilalas do not admit the Barela and Bhil women in their group. If a Barela man brings a Bhil wife, he can be excommunicated until he leaves his Bhil wife.

With the impact of trade, cash crops etc. this hierarchisation becomes even more pronounced and we find that asymmetry emerges even within the different clans of a sub-group, leading to disruption of reciprocal exchange even amongst them. In West Nimar this process of asymmetry within sub-groups is fairly advanced too. Amongst the Bhilalas we find that there is an unequal marital exchange between the Bhilalas of Nimar and that of Rath. Though the Bhilalas of Rath have affinal relation with the Nimari Bhilalas the exchange of bride is unidirectional. Women from Rath are accepted as brides by the Nimari Bhilalas but they rarely marry off their daughters to the Rathwas. Similarly the Baria Bhilalas of Mathwar (South of Alirajpur) rarely marry into Rath.

Exaction of tribute, taxes, etc. and unequal exchange of products and labour has created resource asymmetry amongst the Bhils and its sub-groups. Some village case studies available indicated a fairly unequal distribution of resources amongst the different sub-groups. Lok Nath Soni has done a village based study of Bhils and their sub-groups and has provided a table on ethnic group wise landholding pattern in the Bhilkhera village of Khargone. The study suggests that Bhilala have the maximum resources under their command.
Landholding in the village Bhilkhera (landholding per family in acres)
Ethnic groups 0-5 acres 6-10 acres 11-15 acres 16-20 acres 21-25 acres < 26 acres Landless labour Total
Bhilala 20 18 9 12 6 4 2 71
Bhil (Tadvi) 4 - - - - - 6 10
N. Mankar 2 - - - - - 25 27
C. Mankar - - 2 - - - - 2
Bharud - - - - - - 5 5
Nai - - - - - - 1 1
Bairagi - - - - - - 1 1
Total 26 18 11 12 6 4 53 130

Our own fieldwork also suggests that on the whole the Bhilalas control maximum resources, followed by Barelas, the position of the Bhils is the most precarious. Uneven access to resources has impacted on the capacity of the Bhilalas, Barelas and Bhils to reproduce themselves. That the capacity of the Bhils to sustain themselves is diminishing can be seen in the declining demographic growth rate of the Bhils vis-à-vis Bhilalas and Barelas. As per the 1931 Census of the Central Indian Agency there were 76149 Bhilalas in the entire Holkar state, the population of Bhils was greater and stood at 83232 persons. By 1971 the position had reversed, in the 1971 Census the population of Bhilalas in West Nimar stood at 141997 while the Bhil population was only 71,866 persons. Similarly Barelas were not even mentioned in the 1921 Census, however, by 1971 we find that their population that stood at 158706, was twice as numerous as that of the Bhils.

Though Bishwa Bandhu Chatterjee see this as “indicative of existence social currents leading to the diminution in the ranks of the Bhils and their absorption in the Barela and Bhilala tribe who are considered more respectable…” The reason for this is essentially demographic. Given the ritual and social codes of distancing between the Bhils, Bhilala and Barelas that has been stated above, it would appear implausible that Bhils would be accommodated amongst the Bhilalas and the Barelas. In fact the slow demographic growth the Bhils is a result of the decreased capacity of the Bhils to sustain large families. The AIBAS data shows the average family size for Bhils of Madhya Pradesh in the year 1981 was 5 while that of the Bhilalas was 6. Since there is correlation between average family size and demographic growth it appears more plausible that the decline in the demographic growth of the Bhils vis-à-vis the Bhilalas and the Barelas has demographic reasons and not because of the assimilation of individual Bhils into the Bhilala and Barela fold.

This brings us to the second impact of the exploitation on the Bhils and their sub-groups. We have demonstrated till now that by increasing stratification between clans, lineages, sub-groups and individuals the lateral filiations of the Bhil community was broken. With it institutions of collective labour, redistribution of resources and reciprocity in exchange either became weak or were disrupted. However, contrary to this the position of the elders, i.e. fathers, and the kinship structure was consolidated. Infact there are two major nodes of latent asymmetry in adivasi community: first that in the exchange of nubile women and second in the concentration of rights of decision making and the unilateral claim on the labour of the youth by the elderly. In fact gerontocratic ideology is the dominant ideology of adivasi social formation. I have demonstrated that with the weakening of the lateral filiations of the adivasi community the latent asymmetry in exchange of nubile women is made manifest. Now I demonstrate that how kinship structure that is vertical filliation and sustains gerontocracy gets further consolidated owning to the special forms of exploitation of the adivasi community.

There are at least three important reasons as to why kinship structure is consolidated. I have already forwarded one of them while discussing the specific forms adopted for the exploitation of the adivasi community. While discussing this I had indicated that the ginning/spinning mill owners have encouraged the development of a temporary labour market. By doing so they gain cheap labour force without the responsibility of maintaining them in the periods when work is not available. For this it is imperative that even when the adivasi community is opened up it is not completely destroyed; if the adivasi community is completely destroyed it will no longer be possible to push the workers back to it in the lean periods. Thus, for successful remittance of cheap labour from the adivasi community it is necessary that even though the lateral filiations are ruptured in order to open up the community the vertical filiations i.e. the kinship structure remains intact.

For the migrant adivasi workers also it is beneficial that the kinship structure remain intact. Though by working in the spinning/ginning mills the adivasi worker is doubly exploited (for elaboration on this point see ch. III) yet he gains cash that is scarce in the adivasi community. This in turns enables him to increase his income, thus, even though the adivasi is exploited he improves his position within his own community. But the labourer can gain in this way only if the kinship structure is there in order to subsidise the labour. If kinship structure were to break up such low wages will become absolutely none remunerative. Thus kinship structure is required to provide security and succour in times of need. This is true even in non-economic sphere, since kinship structure is seen as a place for shelter and protection in moments of danger. We came across this function of the kinship structure in the unfortunate case of Uma, who was the wife of late Kalia. She was raped, stripped naked and thrown out of Julwania village. In the situation of crisis she fled to her natal home in Kabri and sought refuge. Her kinsfolk were determined to take revenge.

The third reason is that kinship proves to be one of the leavers for penetration of cash in and for pushing labour out of the adivasi community. Jos M.van der Klei’s work shows how kinship structure pushed the adivasi youth to migrate as seasonal labour. In West Nimar too we find that kinship structure is one of the chief conduits through which cash took roots in the adivasi community. We had argued that cash took roots in the adivasi community initially to pay rent, taxes and tribute. But soon cash replaced symbolic goods in rituals and ceremonies. One of the chief institutions that got so transformed was marriage where cash has become the predominant form of bride price. Amongst the Bhils marriages involving bride price is fixed by middle man i.e. Bhandgidi. Once the marriage proposal is accepted bride price is paid. This is in the sole custody of the father of the bride. Thus gerontocracy has gained from the monitisation of relations. Kinship structure is thus consolidated since gerontocracy the dominant group in kinship structure is strengthened by penetration of cash. Since kinship thus provides ground for cash to take root with the adivasi community it becomes an aid rather than obstacle to the feudal and capitalist social formations. Therefore these later are also interested in its consolidation.

From the above account of forms and impact of the exploitation of the adivasi community we can briefly summarise the dialectics of transformation and consolidation of adivasi community. With the impact of invasions in the early medieval period by the Rajputs and subsequently by the Marathas the Bhil community was opened up. This also led to the introduction of money since this was the medium to pay revenue and taxes. The opening up was furthered under capitalism (inaugurated under the aegis of British colonialism). Thus the adivasi social formation was articulated with feudal and then capitalist social formation. This opening up led to the rearticulating of the internal structures of the adivasi social formation. The lateral filiations within the adivasi social formation were either disrupted or weakened and were replaced by relations that reflected the stratifications appropriate to the social formations with which it was articulated. Articulation with feudalism led to the disintegration of the Bhils into asymmetrically related sub-group where rigid hierarchy and social distancing was maintained based on birth and feudal privileges. Articulation of capitalism led to the emergence of economic stratification within these sub-groups and also beginning of the process of individuation within the sub-groups.

Impact of exploitation on cultural-religious sphere: Specific forms adopted to open up and exploit the adivasi community means that the lateral filiations of the adivasi social formation were disrupted or weakened, however, the vertical filiations get consolidated since they rather than being obstacles for the articulation are one of he principal institutions that create conditions for cash to take roots in the adivasi community. This specific dialectics of transformation-consolidation results in determining the contemporary mutated form of the adivasi social formation. The articulation of he Bhils with the succession of invaders and market economy has resulted in its recasting where by the community now incorporates three kinds of relations:
1. Asymmetrical relation between the Bhils and their sub-groups.
2. Economic stratification within every sub-group.
3. Vertical filiations of kinship ties.

Thus the dialectics of transformation and consolidation impacts upon the social and economic structures of the Bhil community.

Rival Political Organisations: The Congress and the Sangh Parivar

In Madhya Pradesh the Congress and the RSS backed Jana Sangh that later morphed into the Bharatiya Janata Party, dominate power politics. In 1947 the Congress party enjoyed unchallenged supremacy. However, by 1952 it faced a challenge from the right wing organisations. The Hindu Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad were in the forefront of this rightwing challenge. Subsequently, however, the Jana Sangha became the main right wing challenge. From the centre-left and left too there was some attempt to breach the political monopoly of the Congress. The KMPP, PSP, SSP, CPI, etc attempted this. The PSP and SSP, particularly the PSP made significant gains in the third general election. However, since then there hold in Madhya Pradesh has reduced significantly. In 1996 Lok Sabha election BSP emerged as the third force, but it could not quite match this performance in the subsequent elections.

The Congress is the oldest political party in Madhya Pradesh. It was in the forefront of anti-British struggle in the Central Provinces and Berar. In Madhya Pradesh, Vindhya Pradesh and Bhopal, prior to independence, ‘Prajamandal’ were the only organised political organisations. These Prajamandals were affiliated to the congress. Hence, after independence the Congress became the ruling party in the state. This expansion of the Congress is largely due to the influence of powerful and charismatic leaders. In the initial few years after the independence Mr. Ravi Shankar Shukla was the driving force behind the political dominance of the party. However, on his death on 31st December 1956 no other leader emerged that commanded the respect of the entire party. Instead, there emerged a series of leaders with regional and sectional influence that competed with each other for power, position and electoral posts against each other. In the first phase after Mr. Shukla’s death, i.e. between 1956-67 K N Raju, B R Mandloi and D P Mishra emerged as the main contending leaders. After 1967 a new generation of leaders emerged. Though D P Mishra still was a very important leader, this period witnessed the rise of the Shukla brothers, Arjun Singh, a little later Madhav Rao Scindhia and more recently Digvijay Singh and a few others.

These leaders had a regional base and following. The Shukla brothers had their base in Chattisgarh; D P Misra was powerful in Sagar-Jabalpur area. G N Singh was the leader of the Vindhya Pradesh area. Deshlahera was established in Madhya Bharat. Of the next generation of leaders Arjun Singh has a stronghold in Satna, Madhav Rao was entrenched in the erstwhile princely state of Gwalior, while Kamal Nath is based in Chattisgarh. The reason for the rivalry amongst these regionally influential leaders is the top heavy and bureaucratically centralised party structure. Being the oldest party in Madhya Pradesh the Congress had it party structure even in the remotest areas of the state. But the fulcrum around which congress politics rotated was gaining victory in elections since that was the mainstay of Congress’ power and patronage. Thus distribution of tickets is the most crucial way to exercise control over the party structure as well as over the politics of the state. It is here that excessive centralization of the party creates conditions of rivalry and animosity amongst the regional leaders.

In the selection of electoral candidates of the Congress three institutions are crucial viz. District Congress Committee (DCC), Pradesh Election Committee (PEC) and the Central Election Committee (CEC). Application for party ticket are collected at the DCC and forwarded to the PEC. PEC forwards the list of recommended candidates to the CEC, which has the final say in selecting the candidates. Since, decision making lies primarily with the PEC and the CEC efforts to gain upper hand in these bodies leads to intense rivalry amongst the leaders. The run up to the fourth legislative assembly election, held in 1967, witnessed intense manoeuvring between D P Mishra and his rival faction that was won by the former since he was not only close to Indira Gandhi and Kamraj but also a member of the CEC. Another example of rivalry of this intensity was in 1994 local election when the tussle between the evenly matched Arjun Singh and the Shukla brothers to corner maximum seats for their followers disrupted the process of ticket distribution. Consequently, the state Congress I could not distribute tickets for 17 municipal corporation and 92 municipal councils.

Thus Congress is a centralised political structure whose politics is based on securing electoral victory in order to capture the state and central government. However, the political structure of the party expanded and is sustained by influential leaders. This bringing together of two contradictory processes—i.e. centralisation based and nurtured on strong regional leaders has led to intense factionalism in the party. The RSS backed Jana Sangh and subsequently BJP is a centralised political edifice too. However the organisation is structured differently from the Congress.

Instead of expanding the party by associating influential personalities the Jana Sangh made building of a cadre based party as the most important thrust of expansion. Kushabhau Thakre laid down the basics of this infrastructure in the early 1950s. In 1940s he was and RSS sangathan pracharak of Ratlam, Chittor and Mandasaur districts. In 1951 he became the sangathan mantri for Jana Sangha in Malwa, in 1953 in the state of Madhya Bharat and in 1956 for the newly established state of Madhya Pradesh. In West Nimar the sangathan was built by the efforts of Balchandra Badgare and Ram Chandra Bade. The former was the founder of the local branch of RSS in 1939, while the latter joined the RSS after leaving the Congress party in the aftermath of partition. However, these leaders were functioning under the rigid disciplinary and organisational principle laid down by the RSS.

The Jana Sangha and subsequently the BJP have a centralised party structure. At the base of the edifice is the Sthaniya Samiti (local unit). Above them are the Mandal Samiti, the Zila Samiti (district unit), the Sambhag Samiti (divisional unit) and finally the Pradeshik Pratinidhi Sabha (state unit) that is the apex body of the party in the state. The state unit is answerable to the Central Parliamentary Board. This centralised structure is decisive in every activity of the party where decisions flow from top to bottom. For instance we witness that just like Congress the final decision to recommend and select the candidates for election rests with the higher body. The canditate desirous to contest the election has to submit his/her application to the Mandal Samiti, which is forwarded to the Zila Samiti. The zila samiti sends its recommendations to the State Parliamentary Board from where the cases are recommended to the Central Parliamentary Board that finally selects the candidates.

The RSS has a tight leash on the organisation. The activists from the RSS control key positions in the party structure. Expansion of the organisation is based not so much on inclusion of influential leaders with a vote base, but rather on establishing new units of activists. Every aspect of the organisations activity is geared at building the activist units. While analysing the rise of Jana Sangha in the fourth general election in Madhya Pradesh B R Purohit has done a detailed analysis of the organisation building thrust of the party. He believes that it is this organisation building thrust that enabled the party to “penetrate into every constituency of the state.” We have already described in brief the chief units of the organisational structure; Purohit indicates that the party structure duplicates the administrative units of the state. For instance division and districts are the administrative units of the state, in consonance with this the party has its units. Thus at the level of the division the party has the sambhag samiti. Below them at the district level there are zilla samitis and under them are the mandal samitis. The basic unit of the organisation are the local units—the sthaniya samiti.

This structure is then deployed to wrest political power through elections. It comes easily since a mandal is coextensive with an assembly seat, which is the area of activity of the mandal samiti and the sthaniya samitis are coextensive with that of a polling booth. Indeed as per Purohit’s analysis contesting election is a handmaiden of organisational expansion. Purohit points out “An obligatory condition for proposing a JS (Jana Sangh) candidate for an assembly seat is that there must be at least 600 primary members in the Mandal concerned.” Thus the Jana Sangh (subsequently BJP) is a cadre based centralised organisation. This organisation is controlled by the RSS since its functionaries are appointed to crucial organisational posts. In addition to developing a disciplinarian and centralised party structure due care is also taken to maintaining the ideological fidelity of the party.

In order to rigidly implement the ideological doctrines of the party organisational posts, especially that of the sangathan mantris, were given precedence over those of activists involved in elections. This emphasis on the power and position of sangathan mantris led to the elaboration of a dual power structure the first comprising the organisational leaders and second comprising the public figures who contested elections. Precedence was given to the first since this provided the infrastructure of the party. The task of this structure was not only to maintain the cohesion of the party but also to keep its activities in line with the ideology and programmes of the central leadership. B R Purohit demonstrates how activities at the local level were brought in line with the central programme.

During the fourth general election the Madhya Pradesh unit of Jana Sangha received a three point ideological programme consisting of issues close to the political thinking of the RSS and the central leadership. This ideological programme provided the broad framework for the campaign to which some issues of local character and significance were also added. In order to maintain ideological fidelity due care was taken even in selecting the candidates to be fielded for elections. Party members were divided into two categories, primary and active. The major difference between them was the years of work they put into building the organisation. A primary member who put in more than three years in the party was promoted to active member. It was this latter category of member, who had a good understanding of the political and ideological character of the party, that were chose to represent the party in the election.

Thus building of a centralised party structure is not the chief distinguishing trait between the RSS backed parties and the Congress party. Their difference lies in the fact that the RSS backed parties are cadre-based parties. Unlike the Congress in the Jana Sangha/BJP primacy is given to organisational posts, especially that of sangathan mantris, over the parliamentary party or legislative party posts. This primacy of organisational posts helps in maintaining an ideological link between the local activities with the policies and programmes of the central leadership and the RSS. This is the most important reason for the near absence of ideological conflicts between the central and the regional units. In contrast in the Congress party ideological differences between various national leaders (between the left liberal ideas of Nehru and the traditionalist ideas of Malviya, Patel, and Rajendra Prasad, etc.), and between central and regional units (for instance that between Nehru’s central programmes and the traditionalist emphasis of Nanda led Uttar Pradesh unit). In Madhya Pradesh there was a significant ideological difference in the Congress ideological position at the centre and the D P Misra led Congress ministry in Madhya Pradesh in the 1950’s, on the issue of religious conversion.

Primacy of the organisational structure and office bearers over politicians also kept factionalism in the Jana Sangha/BJP in check. The sangathan mantris were powerful organisational people who always intervened in cases of clash of interest between individuals or groups. This intervention was always considered to be non-partisan since the sangathan mantris rarely participated in elections and were seen to above the interests of electoral positions. Hence, there was a virtual absence of faction rivalry within the Jana Sangha/BJP, until the 1990’s. Jafferlot argues that this aspect of the organisational check has undergone a change since the formation of Patwa ministry in 1990 when a political core group was formed under the leadership of Kushabhau Thakre to oversee the conduct of the ministers. While this formation of the core group asserted the primacy of the organisational structure of politicians it eroded the assumption of neutrality in the interventions of the sangathan mantris since Kushabhau Thakre was seen as being favourably inclined towards Patwa and Aggarwal. This erosion of neutrality of sangathan mantris led to the emergence of groupism and finally factionalism in the BJP by the 1996 election.

Thus the two major parties in Madhya Pradesh though having a centralised structure have different organising principles. With these two organising principles the two have been locked in a combat to capture power in Madhya Pradesh. This combat essentially entailed extending the sphere of influence of the respective parties over different regions and social groups/classes in Madhya Pradesh. There is a very engaging analysis of this contest in the works of Jafferlot, Purohit and Kaushik that have been referred to in this section. The summum and bonum of these strategies was to expand vote percentage and political influence in a particular region either through electoral alliances with political organisations or by involving old ruling families or social notables. However, the Jana Sangha primarily adopted the first. The Congress party did not engage in any significant electoral alliances, except on a couple of occasions with the CPI (Communist Party of India), but the latter were a very junior partner in the alliance.

It ought to be noted, however, that the efficacy of the strategies varied in different regions. For instance the role of the old ruling families was limited to the erstwhile Princely states of Vindhya Pradesh, Madhya Bharat and Chattisgarh. These states were cocooned from the national movement, instead political movement was limited to the activities of Praja Mandals. Hence, the old ruling families managed to retain their power and social clout. Thus, both the Congress party and the parties backed by the RSS vied for the support of the rulers. Consequently the ruling dynasty of Rewa and Gwalior acquired a very high political profile. Some other ruling families such as that of Narsinghgarh, Khairagarh, Kanker and Sakti were also courted. The political fortune of the Congress and the RSS backed political groups was largely dependent on the support of these families.

Situation in Mahakoshal is slightly different. This region was governed directly by the British and witnessed intense anti-colonial political activities. Consequently, the Congress party was well entrenched in this region. Furthermore, the political consciousness of the region was fairly developed. Thus, the RSS backed rightwing groups found it relatively difficult in establishing their control in the region. In a region wise table of legislative assembly polls prepared by Jaffrelot shows that it took eight elections between 1957 to 1990 for the right wing parties to secure a majority of seats in this region. It must be pointed out that the Congress lost much of its seats even in the 1977 elections, but this was an exceptional case, since the elections were being held in the aftermath of emergency and the resulting anti-Congress wave. The Janta Party provided the main opposition to the Congress party.

Other than electoral alliances and support from the princely families, an important element of expanding the sphere of influence was to develop social groups and classes as vote banks. Challenge to the hegemony of the Congress party both by the right wing and the centre-left parties entailed attempts to develop bases amongst the middle class, peasants and the adivasis. In the case of West Nimar, however, the most significant issue to wrest political control was the conversion of adivasis into vote banks. The Jana Sangha was the first to initiate programs to develop the adivasis as vote banks. Nawad and issues related with agriculture were one of the main planks in these attempts to galvanise the adivasi vote bank.

In West Nimar the efforts to mobilise the adivasis was initiated as early as 1952. Balchandra Badgare and Ram Chandra Bade were the main architects of this process. The organisation took up the issue of Nawad and won the legislative assembly seat in 1952. They led a delegation to Indore in 1953 to give a political profile to their activities. In the 1960’s the issue of Nawad became volatile. In the name of deforestation the Congress government attempted to evict the adivasi from forestland. A couple of years later in June 1962 the government sent in police to destroy the harvest in the concerned villages. The Jana Sangha and Mr. Bade submitted memorandum to the forest minister and persuaded him to suspend the action. They organised demonstrations of adivasis in Bhopal thus the Congress ministry was forced to set up a commission that advised against eviction of adivasis.

The killing of the Raja of Bastar on 26 March 1966 provided another opportunity to galvanise the adivasis. The Raja had some popularity amongst his erstwhile subjects owing to his generosity. This assassination along with the issue of Nawad was used extensively in the fourth general election. Subsequently, in late 1980’s and 1990 the BJP conducted a loan waving campaign that was particularly popular fancy especially in the adivasi areas. The Patwa government, however, did not fulfil the promise; citing financial constraints loan waiving was restricted to debts up to Rs 10000. Resultant feeling of betrayal led to not only the debacle in 1991 lok sabha election but also the following assembly election in 1993, especially in the adivasi constituencies.

The Congress party that had failed to raise issues of nawad, etc., since it was committed to the various forest laws, took to re-establishing its vote base amongst the adivasis in 1994. In Digvijay Singh’s ministry the Madhya Pradesh government promised to regularise the land claimed from the forest prior to 1980. The promise elicited immense response, lakhs of adivasis across the state applied for the regularisation of their land. The attempt was clearly aimed at consolidating the support base of the Congress party at a time when the BJP had lost ground in the adivasi constituency. However, this scheme fell far short of the expectation of the adivasis. The documentary proofs required for regularisation were often not available with the adivasi, thus an overwhelming majority of the cases were rejected. Moreover, under this scheme the application of the adivasis had to cleared from the centre where it got held up for four years. With the next assembly election approaching the Congress ministry passed a new law under which land could be distributed under the special powers of the Governor in scheduled areas.

The two comparisons: Evaluating the AMS

This section tackles the objective set for the second section in the opening remarks, that of evaluating the Adivasi Mukti Sangathan. As argued above it involves two kinds of comparison, first that between the programme and style of functioning of AMS with the larger political organisations, in this case the Congress and the BJP. This will help us primarily in understanding the specific nature and character of the AMS vis-à-vis the mainstream political parties. Second, we will compare AMS’ programme and tactics with the specific form of exploitation and the impact of this exploitation on the internal structure of the Bhils and their sub-groups and the relationship between them. This will primarily help us in understanding the adequacy of the programme and tactics adopted by the AMS in ameliorating the adivasi situation.

The difference between the mainstream political parties and the AMS appears fairly apparent at a cursory glance. The AMS as we have argued above has a local and decentralised structure. It promotes local initiatives and politics and hence has actively collaborated in the formation of organisation based on local political initiatives viz. Jagrit Adivasi Sangathan, Adivasi Ekta Sangathan, Adivasi Kisan Sangathan, etc. These organisations are autonomous and the links between them and the AMS is one of similarity of politics and ideology. The organisation is also a part of national level networking, however, this is different from the command structure of the mainstream national parties. Instead it is a coming together of organisations with congruent political goals and ideologies while retaining their organisational and political autonomy. Thus, in the organisational strategy of the AMS the autonomy of the local politics and initiative is promoted.

In contrast the mainstream national parties have a centralised and hierarchical political structure where the local unit is linked to larger units and finally to the central unit in an unequal relationship. The apex of the organisation controls policy formulations and ideology, etc. Since the logic of organisational expansion determines that some space is yielded to issues of local concern, yet it is ensured that these local issues are kept within the programmes and ideological framework laid down by the apex body. We have mentioned the importance of the high command in determining the contours of the party programme in the Congress and also the tactics that the Jana Sangha/BJP adopt in linking the local issues with the national programme. Since the movement of ideas, programmes and policies are from the apex body to the local unit. Due care is taken to keep the activities of the local units under constant check. This is achieved in the Jana Sangha/BJP by placing functionaries of the RSS in key organisational positions at every level of the party structure. In the Congress party this is achieved by the fact that political destinies of rival faction depends on which of them wrest control over the District Congress Committee (DCC), Pradesh Election Committee (PEC) and the Central Election Committee (CEC). In other words the asymmetrical organisational structure ensures that whoever captures the higher bodies can dictate the course of the activities of the local politics.

Thus, while the AMS advocates decentralised politics and promotes the autonomy of local initiative, in contrast the Congress Party and the BJP advocate centralised politics that controls and keeps local initiatives in check. Evidently even at the most apparent level the specificity of the political initiative of the AMS, vis-à-vis the mainstream parties, is evident. However, if we look at it more deeply we will understand that the significance of the political initiative of the AMS does not lie in its organisational principle alone. In fact, the most crucial significance of the political initiative of the AMS, vis-à-vis the mainstream political parties, is that they inhere distinct political spaces. To understand this we have to recall the arguments elaborated in section I. There we had argued that within Madhya Pradesh there are various locales with relatively autonomous temporal-spatial structuring. We had further argued that these locales are not isolated entities but exist in an unequal relationship with other locales that constitute the whole. The boundaries of the local and its principle of unity are determined by the contours of the dominant practices of a given formation The principle of relative autonomy, which is based on the temporal-spatial structuring of particular locales; and the principle of unity, which follows the contours of the dominant practices of a given formation together determine the spaces of politics.

If we look at the manner in which the AMS and the mainstream political parties deal with local issues it becomes evident that they inhere different political spaces. While the mainstream political parties inhere the political space determined by the principle of unity, i.e. political process that emerges from the dominant social formation and that inscribes the locales in an unequal relationship to constitute a totality. The AMS inheres the political space carved out by the temporal spatial structuring of the locale. For instance, even when the mainstream parties take up local issues they subordinate it to the concerns of the dominant social formation. In West Nimar while taking up the adivasi issues land scarcity and indebtedness were identified important and made the main plank for adivasi mobilisation. Yet both the Congress party and the Jana Sangh/BJP repeatedly either recanted on these issues by citing larger concerns or used these issues to further the control of the political centre on adivasi affairs. In the section on forms of adivasi exploitation I have indicated that how laws related to land alienation formulated in the Congress regime were deployed in such a way to increase the control of the administrative machinery on the adivasi social formation. Even in 1994 when the Congress government promised legalisation of Nawad prior to 1980 the process of verification was intended to enhance official control and scrutiny. Furthermore, it furthered the penetration principle of individual ownership over communitarian values of adivasi social formation.

Similarly, in order to use indebtedness as the plank to galvanise adivasis the BJP coordinated a loan waiving campaign in 1988-1990, yet when its ministry was formed it cited budgetary constraints to implemented it in a very restricted form. Even in the case of Nawad that was one of the most important planks for mobilising the adivasis for the Jana Sangha/BJP, yet under the BJP led NDA government the realities of globalisation were cited as the reason for the implementation of the Forest Conservation (Amendment) Act of 1988 that had a provision under which adivasis could be evicted from forestland. It is equally remarkable that in the mobilisations of the Congress and the Jana Sangha/BJP the theme of the political empowerment of the adivasi is absent. Evidently then the politics of the Congress and the Jana Sangha/BJP is to further the penetration and control of the political processes of the dominant social formation on the locale.

The AMS, however, handles the local issues in a radically different way. Rather than linking issues of local concern to pull the locale in the subordinating processes of the dominant social formation it seeks to maintain and further the specificity and the autonomy of the locale. Thus, local issues are not used to convert the adivasis into vote bank; they are not handled in a way to increase administrative control and scrutiny on adivasi social formation. On the contrary the local issues are used to further political autonomy of the locale. Thus the economic and social issues, the critique of development, etc. that is the main vehicles to address the issues concerning the adivasis is linked to the questions of self-rule of the adivasi: Perhaps in the manner, in which they handled the issue of Nawad, establishes the contra-distinction of the AMS vis-à-vis the mainstream parties.

We have discussed at some length how issues related to land rights, nawad and land alienation was used by the mainstream parties to establish administrative control on the adivasis and convert them into a vote bank, contrary to this the AMS uses these issues to critique the activities of the mainstream party and to establish the right of the adivasis over forest, land and water. During its opposition to the loopholes in the proposed plan of the Madhya Pradesh government to legalise Nawad prior to 1980, the AMS rather than cashing in on the anxiety of the adivasis in a populist way chose a far more difficult path. It undertook to educate the adivasis on the politics of Nawad. It clearly stated in its leaflet that the Politicians, forest officials, businessmen and dalas had used the issue of nawad to control and exploit the adivasis. It demonstrated the duplicity of the stands taken by the mainstream parties on the issue of Nawad, clearly stating that there support for Nawad amounted to nothing since these parties when in power did nothing to resolve the core issues that created the problem. It identified the central issue being the colonial legacy of forest laws due to which many adivasi villages were declared as forest villages. Even after the departure of the British rulers, when several laws were made to recognise the rights of the tillers over land, absolutely nothing was done to resolve the issue of the adivasis inhabiting in the so-called forest villages. Finally, it demanded recognition of the traditional rights of the adivasi over forest.

Thus, we see that the organisational strategy and the political space occupied by the AMS marks its specificity vis-à-vis the mainstream parties. Rather than participate in power politics that furthered the incursion of the political and economic processes of the dominant social formations over the adivasi social formation, the AMS has opted for a politics that seeks to preserve and further the relative-autonomy of the temporal-spatial structuring of the locale they inhabit. Thus, rather than participate in elections on the pretext of ameliorating the misery of their support base, the AMS instead uses its energy to propagate and achieve its political ideal of local self-rule. It is here, however, that there are some inadequacies in the political analysis of the AMS. They are absolutely correct in rejecting power politics, since this would entail a further subordination of the adivasi social formation to forces of exploitation. They are also correct in establishing connection between power politics and electoral politics. On the basis of this they side step power politics and election and choose to advocate the ideal of local self-rule. However, while sidestepping power politics it would appear that they have also lost focus on the realities of state power. Thus, the often perplexing political tactics witnessed in various political mobilisations of the AMS.

While, the AMS often mobilises against the various agencies of the state viz. corrupt politicians, the actions of police, forest officials and officials at the KUMs, yet it adopted legalistic means in opposing them. In other words while it opposes various arms of the state it simultaneously endeavours to use the laws of the state to fight them. Perhaps it is this failure to recognise the reality of state power that prevented them from adopting measures to secure themselves from it. This could be one of the explanations of the dramatic collapse of the organisation when the state attacked them in the aftermath of the Kabri kand. There inability to theoretically grasp the significance of the processes of the state in articulating the adivasi social formation with capitalism and feudalism is once again evident in their attempt to use the traditional adivasi mechanism of grievance redressal and dispute settlement. We have indicated how the Patels, in case of the judgement of the panchayat going against them, often took recourse the executive and judicial apparatus of the state. In spite of confronting this on several occasions they are yet to device a tactical way out. Perhaps the inadequacy lies in their inability to recognise the crucial role of state power in articulating the adivasi social formation to the dominant social formations.

The AMS has chosen the relatively autonomous space of the adivasi social formation as their arena of politics. In section I we have demonstrated that this locale has its internal structure that is distinct from the structures of the other locales or the regional totality of Madhya Pradesh and the trans-regional totality of the country. Yet, the locale of West Nimar does not exist in isolation, it is inserted in an unequal relationship in the regional totality and the national totality. This insertion is determined by the economic and political processes of the dominant social formations (here feudalism and capitalism). We have further demonstrated in the relevant section above that in the insertion of adivasi social formation, i.e. it articulation with feudalism and capitalism, the role of state is of paramount importance. The state opens up the adivasi social formation so that money can take root in it; subsequently it maintains this articulation through application of force, state policies and ideology. Thus, the political objective of the AMS of establishing local self-rule will acquire true meaning if it adopts in its political agenda transformation of state power and the economic relations of capitalism and feudalism.

This analytical lacuna produces a certain weakness in the political strategy of the AMS. It gives it a distinctly romantic utopian character whereby even when they identify the core issues of the exploitation of the adivasis and locate their politics in a space essential for the prevention of this exploitation, yet they do not have the analytical tools to fulfil their objectives. In this situation their goal of local self-rule remains a desirable but unachievable goal somewhat akin to the Owenian dream of resolution of the exploitation of the workers by making them co-proprietors in a factory in the overall scenario of capitalism. There are other weaknesses too but they emerge from misrecognition of the impact of the articulation of the adivasi social formation with that of feudalism and capitalism. However, one of this impacts on the relative success of the mainstream parties in developing social bases amongst the adivasis and hence needs to be discussed here.

The analytical weakness of not analysing state power notwithstanding the politics and location of the AMS is closer to the ground realities of the adivasis than the mainstream parties. In spite of this we witness the active presence of the mainstream parties amongst the adivasis. This success of the mainstream parties in cultivating a social base amongst the adivasis could be a product of their organisational apparatus, money and muscle power. This is undeniable. In fact the organised presence of the Congress party and the Jana Sangh/BJP predates the AMS by several decades. They have, thus, over a period of times developed well-entrenched support base that cannot be eroded very easily. However, it is also important to see the areas in which the erosion of this support base is taking place due to the activities of the AMS. It is here that we come face to face with the limitations of the support base of the AMS. The support base is primarily amongst the Barelas. In our fieldwork we came across only one Bhilala sympathiser of the organisation and apart from a Bhil phalia in Amli village the support base amongst the Bhils was absent. Thus, even if the AMS were to optimise its base amongst the Barelas the Bhilalas and the Bhils would still be left outside the pale of the organisation, leaving them open to the influence of the rival organisations. It is this limitation of the social base that has left spaces for the mainstream parties to continue their presence.

The limitation of the social base of the AMS is a direct consequence of the incorrect understanding of the three core issues that impacts on the adequacy of the programmes of the AMS:
1. Forms of opening up the Bhils and their sub-group for exploitation.
2. The impact of the exploitation on the social structure of the adivasi community.
3. The very basis of the critique of the exploitation of the adivasis adopted by the AMS. The AMS bases its critique on the critique on the ‘Critique of development’. Thus the focus of the critique is on the processes of exploitation initiated under capitalism, there by ignoring the still existant practices of feudal exploitation.

While discussing the programmes of AMS it was indicated that the AMS demonstrates that the juxtaposition of the adivasis with the vested groups of outsiders has led to the exploitation of the adivasis. Sendhwa that is the commercial hub in their area of activity is seen as the site where this exploitation is centred, thus AMS has made Sendhwa their centre of political activity, and the ‘illegal’ acitivities of the different forms of business communities the targets of their political acitivities. They also endeavour to reduce the dependance of the adivasi community on cash. All these are important activities. I have also argued that pentration of cash after the forcible opening up of the adivasi social formation is the necessary condition of the explotation of adivasi community. Yet in order to ensure continuous remittance of resources from the adivasi community specific forms of exploitation have to be deployed.

These specific forms are determined by the nature of resource that feudalism and capitalism seeks to withdraw from the adivasi community. I have demonstrated, following the works of the Frech marxist anthropologists, that cheap labour is the chief resource that capitalim and feudalism seeks to withdraw from adivasi social formation. Feudalim ensures this through the chakrani and naukarya system, while capitalism ensures it by encourgaging seasonal migration and through the assymetrical structure of its market where goods from the adivasi community are priced cheaper and those from the capitalist sector priced dearly. Unfortunately, the AMS has failed to recognise these forms and hence has not been able to understand the deterimental impact of these forms on the adivasi community. Thus, there is nothing in their programme to counter it. Consequently, the viability of their struggle in preventing the exploitation of the adivasis is compromised. It is urgent therefore to include issues of seasonal migration, assymetrical market structure, and naukarya and chakrani systems as the targets in the political programmes. The continued effectivity of processes initiated under feudalims means that a simple invocation of tradition, as is done by the AMS, is not sufficient to find alternative principles to fight the exploitation of the adivasis. One will have to, as it were, sift through tradition to find those aspects only that strengthen egalitarian and communitarian principles. We will see that this sifting is a very difficult task since the opening up of adivasi society to money economy has resulted in the erosion of these institutions, the institutions that carried latent asymmetries even in the adivasi social formation have however been consolidated.

The understanding of the AMS on the impact of the penetration of money on the social structure of the adivasis is incomplete. While they understand the gensis of a section of relatively rich adivasis, yet they fail to understand the peculiarity of the transformation of the adivasi social formation. I have demonstrated in the relevant sections of above that there are three main features of the transformtion of the adivasi social formation when money takes root in it, i.e. when the adivasi social formation is articulated to feudalism and/or capitalism:
1. Adivasi social formation, when it is articulated with feudalism and/or capitalism, undergoes dialectics of transformation and consolidation. Those institutions that are deterimental to the furtherance of penetration of cash are transformed, these are the institutions and practices arising from lateral filiation i.e. the communitarian and egalitarian aspects of adivasi society. On the other hand institutions arising out of vertical filiations, such as kinship, gerontocracy, etc. are consolidated since they provide the strongest levers for penetration of money in the adivasi society.
2. Penetration of cash creates a section of relatively rich adivasis.
3. Penetration of cash creates asymmetry.
Together these three aspects of transformation means that even when penetration of cash results in the creation of rich and poor that does not erode the kinship structure, even as the communitarian and egalitarian instiutions get eroded. Furthermore, another symptom of penetration of cash is the creation of asymmetry between different clans and lineages. Thus the unequal relation between the Bhilala, Barela and Bhil community is a direct consequence of the opening up the Bhil society to money.

Since the AMS has not understood the specific dialectics of transformation of the adivasi social formation they do not understand the significance of the continued social base of the relatively richer sections of the adivasi community, in this instance the Patels amongst the Barela community. Thus they are unable to understand and counter the social base of the Patel in their clan or lineage. They fail to realise that the creation of the rich section of Patels and the consolidation of kinship structure are both a result of penetration of money in the adivasi society. This necessary link between the affluence of Patels and the kinship ties leads them to make tactical errors. Their inablity of understand the necessary link between penetration of money, affluence of Patels and the consolidation of kinship ties has resulted in reduction of the explaination of the activities of the Patels opposing them to vested personal interests. Thus, they argue that the Patels of the ilk of Jhagadia Patel were driven by vested interests. While this may be true but they still had support in their respective phalias. This individualisation of the motives of Patels has resulted in the concious strategy of attempting to use the Patels for helping the organisation. In the section on the organising principles of the AMS I have discussed how the Patel of the village is incorporated the the organisation. However, since the continued presence of the Patel and their hold over their clans and lineage is a function of the penetration of money in the adivasi community it can definitely blunt the activities of the AMS to check the further perculation of money in the adivasi community.

The failure to understand the impact of money in dividing the adivasi community into asymmetrical clans and lineages has resulted in complete a unconsciousness to the political implication of their decision to limit their social base primarily amongst the Barelas. Not only are the Barelas socially and economically more advantaged than the Bhils, in fact the division of Bhils into Bhil, Barela and Bhilala a result of the pentration of money. It stands to reason that until unless some tactics is worked out to bridge the gap amongst the Bhils and their sub-groups it will be impossible to eradicate the negative impact of money of the adivasi community.

From above we can surmise that the organizing prinipal and the political location of the AMS is radicaly different to the parties such as the Congress and the BJP. The organising principle and the political location of the AMS brings it closer to the real world of the adivasi and their politics. However, in order to improve their affectivity the AMS ought to makes some corrections in their understanding of state power, the forms of exploitation of the adivasi community as well as the impact of the opening up of the adivasi social formation on the social and cultural structures of the adivasis.


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